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This dissertation investigates two fundamental issues regarding managerial 
discrimination among analysts during earnings conference calls.  Discrimination is defined 
as a manager systematically choosing to interact more (less) with analysts holding 
favorable (unfavorable) views of the firm during earnings conference calls.  The first issue 
is whether discrimination exists.  The second issue is whether discrimination impacts the 
market’s interpretation of quarterly earnings news.  Examining these issues is important 
because lawmakers and the SEC are concerned that discrimination exists and may have 
detrimental effects on investors.   
To provide empirical evidence on the existence of discrimination, I examine the 
association between individual analyst participation on a firm’s quarterly earnings 
conference call and the outstanding stock recommendation of the analyst.   I find that the 
probability of an analyst being allowed to participate (i.e., to ask a question) during a 
conference call is increasing in the analyst’s view of the firm.  Additionally, such 
differential analyst treatment is more (less) pronounced when managers have higher 
 vii 
(lower) incentives to maintain high stock prices, and when analysts are more (less) reliant 
on management for information.   
To assess the impact of discrimination on the market’s assessment of earnings 
news, I first classify sample conference calls as discriminating and non-discriminating.  I 
then examine the market reaction to earnings news in settings where the manager holds 
discriminating and non-discriminating conference calls.  I find that the market reaction to 
large magnitude good news earnings surprises is amplified when the manager 
discriminates.  On the contrary, the market reaction to small magnitude good news 
earnings and both large and small bad earnings news is invariant to the discrimination level 
of conference call.  Further investigation of the incremental market reaction to large 
magnitude good news earnings for discriminating managers reveals that such reaction 
persists in the presence of relative sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.  
Additionally, good news firms that discriminate exhibit less post earnings announcement 
drift than non-discriminating firms.  These results are more consistent with discrimination 
assisting the market in digesting the implications of good earnings news as opposed to 
aiding the manager in overselling those implications.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This dissertation investigates two fundamental issues regarding managerial 
discrimination among analysts during earnings conference calls.  I define discrimination as 
a manager systematically choosing to interact during the conference call more (less) with 
analysts holding favorable (unfavorable) views of the firm.  The first issue is whether 
discrimination exists.  The second is whether discrimination impacts the market’s 
interpretation of quarterly earnings news.   
In Chapter 2, I investigate whether managers discriminate among analysts during 
earnings conference calls based on how favorably the analyst views the firm.  Lawmakers 
and the SEC are currently considering a push for legal reform to eliminate this type of 
discrimination despite the absence of systematic empirical evidence regarding the 
existence or extent of such discrimination.  Using a large sample of earnings conference 
call transcripts, representing 19,677 firm-quarters and 146,708 analyst-firm-quarter 
observations between 2002 and 2004, I find that the probability of an analyst being 
allowed to participate (i.e., to ask a question) during a conference call is increasing in the 
analyst’s view of the firm.  In particular, the odds of an analyst with a strong buy 
recommendation participating on a conference call are more than double those of an 
analyst with a strong sell recommendation.   
Such differential analyst treatment is more (less) pronounced when managers have 
higher (lower) incentives to maintain high stock prices, and when analysts are more (less) 
reliant on management for information.  Additionally, discrimination appears to exist even 
among those analysts allowed to ask questions during the conference call.  Conditional on 
participating, the order of analyst appearance on the conference call is an increasing 
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function of the analyst’s view of the firm.  Combined these findings validate prior 
anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting that managers discriminate among analysts and 
documents that such discrimination is statistically and economically significant.   
In Chapter 3, I investigate the association between the market reaction to quarterly 
earnings news and managerial conference call discrimination among analysts.  I consider 
the possibility that the “scrutiny” of the questions analysts pose to managers during 
earnings conference calls decreases in the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm.  
Under such a scenario, managerial discrimination – the act of granting (thwarting) 
conference call participation to favorable (unfavorable) analysts – is more likely to result 
in conference calls that highlight (suppress) positive (negative) aspects of the firm, 
possibly making good (bad) earnings news look better than (not as bad as) it really is.  
Understanding how investors view earnings news in the presence of discrimination is 
important because regulators and the SEC have recently voiced concerns that 
discrimination during earnings conference calls may potentially mislead investors (Cox 
2005).   
For a random sample of earnings conference call manager-analyst dialogs, I begin 
by showing that question scrutiny is decreasing in the favorableness of the analyst’s view 
of the firm.  That is, more favorable analysts ask less scrutinizing questions.  However, this 
effect only exists for firms that meet or beat expected earnings.   For firms that miss 
quarterly earnings targets, both favorable and unfavorable analysts become equally 
scrutinizing on average.   
I then classify conference calls as “discriminating” and “non-discriminating” to 
assess how the market views earnings news in each setting.  Managers hosting 
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discriminating (non-discriminating) conference calls interact with analysts that hold views 
more favorable (unfavorable) than the consensus view of the firm held by the population of 
analysts following the firm.  I find that the market reaction to large magnitude good news 
earnings surprises is amplified when the manager discriminates, which is potentially 
consistent with regulatory concerns.  I find no evidence of discriminatory effects for small 
magnitude earnings surprises.  Additionally, the market reaction to bad earnings news, 
both large and small, is invariant to the type of conference call held, consistent with the 
lack of a relation between question scrutiny and the favorableness of the analyst’s view of 
the firm when a firm misses earnings targets.   
The regulatory perspective on discrimination interprets the positive incremental 
market reaction to good news earnings as unsophisticated investors being fooled into over-
reacting to good news earnings.  Further investigation of the regulatory perspective reveals 
that the effect of discrimination on the market reaction to earnings news exists to an equal 
extent among both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.  Additionally, good news 
firms that discriminate exhibit less post earnings announcement drift than non-
discriminating firms.  This implies that discrimination assists the market in digesting the 
implications of large magnitude good news earnings as opposed to aiding the manager in 
overselling those implications.   
Combined, the effects of discrimination on the market reaction to earnings news are 
inconsistent with regulatory concerns and more consistent with managers taking advantage 
of the less scrutinizing environment discrimination brings to more fully elaborate on the 
firm’s prospects and resolve uncertainty in the marketplace. 
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Chapter 2:  Evidence of Management Discrimination Among Analysts During 
Earnings Conference Calls 
2.1  Introduction 
 This chapter investigates whether managers discriminate among analysts by 
allowing conference call participation based on how favorably the analyst views the firm.  
Under Regulation FD, managers cannot privately disseminate material information to 
particular analysts.  However, managers retain the flexibility to publicly provide 
information to analysts of their choosing.  Concerned that managers use this flexibility to 
pressure analysts into positively biased research by accepting (thwarting) conference-call 
questions from favorable (unfavorable) analysts, the SEC is considering a push for legal 
reform (Cox 2005).  However, the SEC’s concerns are based primarily on anecdotal and 
survey evidence of managerial discrimination.  Anecdotes may not indicate a systematic 
problem and analyst survey results may be biased because analysts have incentives to push 
for laws that reduce information search costs.  This chapter seeks to provide direct 
empirical evidence on whether, and to what extent, discrimination exists during conference 
calls.   
I use a new and extensive dataset of conference call transcripts between 2002 and 
2004 to directly measure various aspects of analyst participation during conference calls.  
Transcripts indicate which analysts asked questions during the conference call, when they 
asked the questions relative to other conference call participants, and how long managers 
interacted with each analyst.  I use I/B/E/S to identify a population of analysts who would 
likely seek conference call participation and to measure analyst characteristics, including 
the analyst’s view of the firm.  Using data from these two sources, I model analyst 
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conference call participation as a function of the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the 
firm while controlling for other factors associated with analyst participation.    
I find that the probability of an analyst asking a question during a firm’s earnings 
conference call increases with the favorableness of the analyst’s stock recommendation for 
the firm.  After controlling for other factors, the odds of analysts with strong buy 
recommendations for a firm (i.e., favorable analysts) asking a conference call question are 
more than double those of analysts with strong sell recommendations (i.e., unfavorable 
analysts). This provides strong evidence to support claims that firms discriminate by 
rewarding (punishing) analysts with favorable (unfavorable) views of the firm.  The 
differential treatment of favorable analysts relative to unfavorable analysts is higher when 
managers’ incentives to maintain high stock prices are higher and when analysts must rely 
heavily on management-provided information. Additionally, discrimination exists even 
among analysts who participate on the call.  Favorable analysts are allowed to ask their 
questions before unfavorable analysts, consistent with managers manipulating the question 
queue in a discriminatory fashion. 
 This chapter adds to the empirical literature in a number of ways.  First, I directly 
measure a specific type of management discrimination.  Recent studies (Ke and Yu 2005, 
Huang et al. 2005, Chen and Matsumoto 2005) have used analyst earnings forecast 
accuracy as an indirect proxy for management discrimination because management 
discrimination is generally unobservable.  By design, studies using indirect proxies cannot 
distinguish between the absence of discrimination and failed discrimination attempts, nor 
can they provide insight as to the discrimination method managers used.   
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Second, I add to a management discrimination literature that has reached mixed 
conclusions.  Using analyst earnings forecast accuracy to proxy for differential managerial 
access, Ke and Yu (2005) provide evidence that managers provide better information 
access to favorable analysts compared to unfavorable analysts.  They interpret their 
evidence as consistent with discrimination.  In contrast, Huang et al. (2005) find that 
unfavorable (favorable) analysts actually issue more (less) accurate future earnings 
forecasts, inconsistent with managerial discrimination.  I provide direct evidence consistent 
with Ke and Yu’s (2005) conclusion regarding the existence of discrimination.   
Third, I focus exclusively on the post Regulation FD period, which increases the 
applicability of my findings to current debates on management discrimination.  Extant 
research tests the discrimination hypothesis prior to the passage of Regulation FD.  
Because Regulation FD removed private communications of material information from 
management’s discrimination toolkit, the generalizability of extant results to current 
regulatory regimes is unclear.  One exception is Chen and Matsumoto (2005), who 
conclude that managers discriminated before, but not after, the passage of Regulation FD.  
Their lack of evidence post Regulation FD is inconsistent with growing anecdotal claims 
that discrimination still exists (Mayo 2006, Lowengard 2006, Morgenson 2005, SIA 2005, 
Cox 2005, Davis 2004, Kelly 2003, Solomon and Frank 2003).   
 This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
discrimination hypotheses.  Section 3 outlines the sample selection, variable measurement 
and research design for testing whether managers differentially allow conference call 
participation based on the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm.  Section 4 
presents the empirical results regarding differential conference call participation, and 
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Section 5 assesses whether the results vary with managerial incentives and analyst reliance 
on management-provided information.  Section 6 investigates discrimination among those 
analysts who do participate on the conference call, and Section 7 concludes.   
2.2  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Underpinnings of Managerial Discrimination.  The discrimination hypothesis 
posits that more (less) managerial access will be provided to analysts when their views of 
the firm are favorable (unfavorable).  Discrimination results from both a manager’s desire 
for high stock prices and an analyst’s need for manager-provided firm-specific 
information.  By allowing differential analyst access, managers make it more costly for 
unfavorable analysts to gather information and compete with more favorable analysts.  
Unfavorable analysts are then forced to either drop coverage or improve their view of the 
firm in order to obtain the information necessary to effectively provide information 
intermediary services.  In this way, managers attempt to drown out negative information 
about the firm which should result in more favorable analyst views of the firm persisting in 
the market.   
If discrimination successfully biases analyst research in the manager’s favor and 
forces unfavorable analysts from the market, investors relying on available sell-side analyst 
research could be misled.  The SEC, in the interest of protecting investors from biased 
information, has recently voiced concerns that manager discrimination during conference 
calls is a serious problem that may require legislative action (Cox 2005).  The SEC’s 
particular concern with the pressures managers impart on analysts is part of a broader 
crackdown on pressures analysts face to issue positively biased research.  The Global 
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Settlement and Regulation Analyst Certification, both in 2003, were intended to remove 
pressures analysts faced from the investment banking side of the brokerage house. 
Anecdotal evidence outlines how managers in particular might discriminate, 
including not inviting unfavorable analysts to meetings where material information will be 
communicated (Siconolfi 1995), not returning their phone calls (Angwin and Peers 2001), 
and not allowing them to ask questions during conference calls (Kelly 2003).  Regulation 
FD, passed in 2000, was meant to curb the differential treatment of analysts by preventing 
managers from privately disclosing material information to certain analysts and not others.  
Despite Regulation FD’s mandate for prompt public disclosure of material information, 
many still disclaim a level playing field for analysts (Morgenson 2005, SIA 2005).  
Constituents assert the problem is not that material information is being privately 
disclosed, but that the public disclosure of such information suits only specific analysts. 
Personal discussions with sell-side analysts provide insights on how public 
information differentially impacts the analyst.  First, an understanding of analyst’s 
incentives is necessary.  Under the regulatory environment considered in this study, much 
of an analyst’s compensation derives from commissions attached to order flow.  The 
largest order flows come from institutional investors, and as such analysts compete for 
institutional order flow.  Analysts differentiate themselves in the eyes of institutional 
investors as preferred information providers by developing niche expertise.   
For example, consider two analysts competing for order flow.  One analyst 
specializes in supply chain while another specializes in foreign markets.  Analysts gather 
private information on their respective niches, which, when combined with manager 
specific information during the conference call, becomes a particularly valuable 
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information bundle for institutional investors.  Indeed, the answer managers provide to the 
supply chain analyst about a supplier relation is of little value to the analyst seeking 
information on foreign sales prospects, but is critical for the supply chain analyst in 
maintaining his niche expertise.  The notion that publicly provided information is 
complementary to individuals conditional on their existing private information is modeled 
in Kim and Verrecchia (1997) and empirically tested by Barron et al. (2005) in the context 
of securities markets.  The same intuition applies here for sell-side analysts competing in 
the market for information. 
While analysts provide in their reports mapping of their information bundles into 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, those mappings are not particularly 
important for institutional investors.  As sophisticated investors, institutions employ their 
own analysts to perform these mappings and use sell-side analysts to provide critical 
valuation inputs in the form of information bundles.  Surveys of institutional investors 
confirm these claims.  Institutions value a sell-side analyst’s industry expertise and access 
to management (i.e. the information bundle inputs) much more than the sell-side analyst’s 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Johnson 2005). 
Since institutions place little weight on the analyst’s ultimate stock 
recommendation, but do value an analyst’s access to management, an analyst’s incentives 
can drive positively biased stock recommendations.  Favorable stock recommendations 
please managers, which in turn allow the analyst access to critical manager provided 
information that is valuable to the analyst’s most lucrative client.  The SEC’s concern 
resides with the unsophisticated investor who relies exclusively on stock recommendations 
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and cannot reasonably incorporate the analyst’s incentives when evaluating a stock 
recommendation. 
Empirical Evidence of Managerial Discrimination.  Evidence of specific 
discriminatory actions by managers has remained largely anecdotal because discrimination 
itself is generally unobservable (Francis et al. 2004).  As a result, the empirical literature 
has focused on investigating the existence of managerial discrimination indirectly; this has 
generated mixed results.  Francis and Philbrick (1993) provide evidence consistent with 
analysts fearing retribution for unfavorable stock recommendations by showing that such 
analysts compensate by issuing optimistic earnings forecasts.   
Under the assumption that higher earnings forecasts help cultivate relationships 
with management, Huang et al. (2005) examine changes in earnings forecast accuracy for 
analysts who issue boldly favorable (unfavorable) annual earnings forecasts.  They find 
that boldly favorable (unfavorable) analysts experience deterioration (improvement) in 
future earnings forecast accuracy and interpret their results as inconsistent with the 
discrimination hypothesis.  Ke and Yu (2005) suggest that managers prefer forecasts that 
help them beat consensus estimates and investigate analysts who issue annual “walk-
down” forecasts or pessimistic quarterly earnings forecasts.1  They find that such analysts 
have more accurate future earnings forecasts compared to other analysts, and interpret their 
results as consistent with the discrimination hypothesis.2   
                                                 
1 Walk-down forecasts are those annual earnings forecasts that are optimistic early in the year and pessimistic 
immediately prior to the earnings announcement (Richardson et al. 2004). 
2 Whether managers prefer optimistic or pessimistic earnings forecasts is an unresolved empirical question.  
The results from Huang et al. (2005) and Ke and Yu (2005) imply that managers prefer, and reward analysts 
for, earnings forecasts that ultimately allow them to beat the consensus forecast.  However, Francis et al. 
(2004) show that, on average, firms report earnings below consensus for much of the sample time period 
covered in both Huang et al. (2005) and Ke and Yu (2005).   Such an outcome is consistent with managers 
preferring optimistic forecasts, as modeled by Lim (2001). 
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Each of the aforementioned studies looks for evidence of managerial discrimination 
prior to the passage of Regulation FD, which limits the generalizability of the results to the 
current regulatory regime.  Chen and Matsumoto (2005) begin to fill this void by 
investigating changes in analyst relative earnings forecast accuracy for analysts who 
downgrade versus upgrade the firm’s stock both pre and post Regulation FD.  They show 
that downgrading analysts have relatively poorer one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast 
accuracy compared with upgrading analysts, but only in the pre-FD era.  Their results are 
therefore consistent with Regulation FD curbing discrimination, at least with respect to 
manager provided information about one-quarter-ahead earnings.  However, their use of 
earnings forecast accuracy changes as indirect discrimination proxies make it difficult to 
distinguish between failed attempts at discrimination and the absence of discrimination 
post-FD.3  Further, their lack of discriminatory evidence post-FD is contrary to growing 
outcry from analysts and regulators that discrimination persists (Mayo 2006, Lowengard 
2006, Morgenson 2005, SIA 2005, Cox 2005, Davis 2004, Kelly 2003, Solomon and Frank 
2003).   
I build on prior literature by utilizing a dataset of earnings conference call 
transcripts to investigate one specific type of managerial discrimination:  differential 
conference call participation.  Investigating this specific type of discrimination is important 
for a number of reasons.  First, management discrimination in the form of differential 
analyst access to management during the conference call is measurable, which allows for 
more direct and powerful tests of the discrimination hypothesis.  Second, the availability of 
                                                 
3 For example, analysts may have searched harder post-FD for idiosyncratic information and covered fewer 
firms more intently as brokerage houses cut back research budgets (Mohanram and Sunder 2003).  
Differential effort in the post-FD period by analysts could potentially be enough to offset the effects of 
discrimination.   
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conference call transcripts has come about largely as a result of Regulation FD.  As such, 
results based on conference call data are relevant to the current regulatory environment.  
Third, and most importantly, the SEC has targeted this specific type of discrimination for 
potential legislation (Cox 2005).  However, the SEC’s concerns are based on anecdotes 
and analyst surveys.  Anecdotes are not evidence of a systematic problem.  Analyst survey 
evidence is potentially biased because analysts have incentives to claim that managers 
discriminate because regulatory intervention could reduce their information search costs.  
Systematic empirical evidence on whether managers discriminate among analysts through 
conference call participation could be an important input to the legislative process.   
 If SEC concerns are warranted because managers do discriminate among analysts 
during earnings conference calls, then the following hypothesis obtains: 
H1:  The probability that an analyst is allowed to participate on a conference call 
is increasing in the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm. 
The discrimination hypothesis is premised on managerial preferences for high stock 
prices.  Therefore, the extent to which a manager discriminates among analysts should vary 
systematically with the manager’s incentives to maintain a high stock price.  This leads to 
the following hypothesis:   
H2:  The extent of discrimination among analysts is higher (lower) for managers 
with higher (lower) incentives for high stock prices. 
 Another underpinning of the discrimination hypothesis is that analysts rely on 
management for information.  In situations where an analyst has alternative sources of 
information, such as general media coverage or information transfer from other firms, 
suppliers, and customers, they may not need much information from management.  
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Discrimination against unfavorable analysts who do not rely heavily on management 
provided information will likely have little effect on changing an unfavorable analyst’s 
view of the firm.  As a result, discrimination should be more pronounced in situations 
where analysts need to rely more heavily on management.4  Stated formally: 
H3:  The extent of discrimination among analysts is higher (lower) when analysts 
rely more (less) heavily on management for information.  
2.3  Sample selection, research design and variable measurement 
Sample 
The empirical analysis utilizes quarterly earnings conference call transcript data 
obtained from the Thomson Financial StreetEvents database.  StreetEvents is a calendar 
data service that allows subscribers to track upcoming information events of publicly 
traded firms, including earnings conference calls, shareholder meetings, IPO lockout 
expirations and other corporate events.  Additionally, the database maintains a history of 
information events, including verbatim earnings conference call transcripts, shareholder 
meeting transcripts, press releases, and SEC filings.   
Sample transcripts fall between January 2002 and December 2004.5  All firm-
quarter observations occur subsequent to the passage of Regulation FD in 2000, which 
provides a strong setting for testing the discrimination hypothesis.  Analysts have few 
substitutes for obtaining material private information from managers outside of the 
conference call.  The proscriptions of Regulation FD require prompt documentation and 
dissemination of material information privately conveyed to analysts, which becomes cost 
                                                 
4 Analysts who need to rely little on management should still seek participation on the conference call.  
Accessing information directly from management should always minimize information search costs relative 
to other substitute information sources, even if other information sources are not prohibitively costly. 
5 The earliest transcripts available on StreetEvents are from 2001, however the year is sparsely populated. 
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prohibitive as the number of analysts grows, making the conference call venue more cost 
effective for managers.6  Consequently, under Regulation FD all interested parties can 
listen to the public dissemination of material information during the conference call, but 
managers still retain flexibility over who is allowed to ask questions.  Managers 
differentially allow analysts to ask questions by either selectively providing analysts with 
the question call-in phone number or by simply passing over particular analysts in the 
question queue.   
I identify an initial sample of 27,642 quarterly earnings conference call transcripts 
that have related coverage in I/B/E/S for the same fiscal quarter end. I use I/B/E/S to 
identify a population of analysts potentially interested in participating on a firm’s quarterly 
earnings conference call.  From this initial sample I require each analyst-firm-quarter 
observation to have both an outstanding earnings estimate and an outstanding stock 
recommendation.  Outstanding earnings forecasts must be issued during the year preceding 
the fiscal quarter end date to help ensure the analyst is actively covering the company.  I 
also require each analyst to have attributes measurable over the most recently completed 
calendar year end. These attributes, discussed more completely below, capture an analysts’ 
experience, effort, and ability relative to other analysts following the firm.  The cumulative 
effect of these requirements results in a final sample of 19,677 earnings conference call 
transcripts and 146,708 analyst-firm-quarter observations.  These observations represent 
2,874 unique firms and 4,251 unique analysts from 402 unique brokerage houses. 
The filtering procedures remove analyst observations with severely stale earnings 
forecasts, firms followed by fewer than two analysts during the prior calendar year, and 
                                                 
6 SIA (2001) provide survey evidence consistent with this notion.  Surveyed sell-side analysts reported fewer 
one-on-one discussions with management after the implementation of Regulation FD.  Brown et al. (2005) 
documents a dramatic increase in earnings conference calls since Regulation FD. 
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analysts who were not on I/B/E/S during the prior calendar year.  Compared with the initial 
sample, the final sample is comprised of analysts who follow the firm more intently, who 
are competing against other analysts for managerial access, and who have had more time to 
establish relationships with company management.  This resulting set of analysts should 
have a strong desire to participate on the firms’ conference calls.7   
I then use the I/B/E/S broker translation files to obtain each analyst’s name and 
brokerage-house affiliation.  Using the analysts’ name and affiliation from I/B/E/S, I 
search for the corresponding name and affiliation of the analyst in the related conference 
call transcript. I identify I/B/E/S analyst i covering firm j at quarter t as “participating” if 
he/she asks a question on the earnings conference call of firm j at quarter t.  From the 
conference call transcript, I also obtain the names and titles of the corporate participants, 
the names and affiliations of all non-corporate participants (a subset of which are the 
I/B/E/S analysts), the order in which each non-corporate participant appears on the 
conference call, the number of words spoken during the briefing portion and question-and-
answer portion of the conference call, the number of words spoken during the entire 
conference call, and the number of words exchanged between each non-corporate 
participant and management.   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample.  Panel A shows that there is 
some growth in the number of firm-quarter and analyst-firm-quarter observations over 
                                                 
7 The ideal sample would be the set of analysts who attempted to ask a question during the conference call, 
regardless of whether management actually allowed the question to be asked.  Unfortunately, this is 
unobservable.  Even if such a set of analysts was obtainable, it is unclear whether analysts with unfavorable 
views, anticipating management’s actions, would even attempt to ask a question on the call.  Analysts not 
attempting to ask question for fear of management discrimination is precisely the behavior the SEC and 
legislators are interested in preventing. 
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time, consistent with the StreetEvents database gaining popularity.8  Panel B shows the 
concentration of observations across industries.  There is some clustering in the computer 
and financial industries, which make up 19 percent (22 percent) and 11 percent (12 
percent) of the sample firm-quarters (analyst-firm-quarters).  No other industry makes up 
more than 10 percent of the sample.  Panel C shows that 54 percent (44 percent) of firm-
quarter observations come from the NYSE (NASDAQ) stock exchanges.    
Research design and variable measurement for testing H1 
Testing the discrimination hypothesis involves modeling the probability that 
analyst i  following firm j  at quarter t  participates on the earnings conference call by 
asking a question.  I therefore estimate the following logistic regression model: 
    OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 SBuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 SSelli,j,t  
             + β5 Openi,j,t  + β6  NumAnalysti,j,t + β7  AllStari,j,t                                          
+ β8  PriorAcci,j,t + β9  FirmExpi,j,t + β10  GenExpi,j,t + β11  Indsi,j,t      
+ β12  ForFreqi,j,t + β13  BrokerSizei,j,t + β14  Companiesi,j,t                       
+ β15  PriorOnCalli,j,t + β16  RecHorizoni,j,t + υi,j,t 
(1) 
The dependent variable, OnCall, is an indicator variable for conference call 
participation that equals 1 if the analyst asks a question on the conference call and zero 
otherwise.  The first four independent variables use stock recommendation levels to proxy 
for how favorably the analyst views the firm.  The use of stock recommendations is 
consistent with SEC and anecdotal claims that cite unfavorable stock recommendation 
levels as reasons for management discrimination (Cox 2005, Solomon and Frank 2003).   
                                                 
8 Coverage of a firm by StreetEvents is driven by subscriber demand.  Therefore, relative to all public firms, 
the sample firms are of interest to the individual and institutional investors that subscribe to StreetEvents.  
Results from analyzing this sample may not generalize to other firms where investor interest is not high.  
However, this sample suits the research question nicely since regulators are likely to be less concerned with 
discrimination in situations where there is little interest in the stock.   
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Sbuy, Buy, Sell and SSell are indicator variables that identify when the analyst’s 
most recent stock recommendation level prior to the conference call is strong buy, buy, sell 
and strong sell, respectively.9  If H1 is true and managers allow conference call 
participation as an increasing function of the analyst’s view of the firm, then strong buy 
recommendation analysts should be more likely than buy recommendation analysts to ask 
questions; buy recommendation analysts should be more likely to participate than hold 
recommendation analysts, and so on.  Equation (1) models the impact of the analyst’s 
recommendation incremental to the base case of a hold recommendation, resulting in the 
following predictions:  β1>β2>0 and 0>β3>β4. 
The discussion thus far only considers the analyst’s view of the firm.  However, a 
well-specified model should include other factors that potentially constrain analysts’ 
participation.  I consider two factors.  First, conference calls are costly to the manager in 
the sense that they take time away from their day to day managing of the firm.  As such, 
conference calls cannot reasonably be expected to answer every question of every analyst.  
Managers generally preset the amount of time they will allow for the entire conference call 
and also select the amount of time they will devote to answering analyst questions.  The 
variable Open proxies for the time allotted for answering analyst questions during the 
conference call and is measured as the ratio of the time spent on the conference call 
answering questions to the total length of the conference call.  Higher values of Open mean 
more chance for an individual analyst to speak with management, which leads to the 
                                                 
9 I use indicator variables at each I/B/E/S recommendation level to allow for discrimination within firms and 
across firms.  Within firm discrimination represents the situation where a manager faces analysts with 
disperse recommendations and chooses the more favorable analysts for participation.  Discrimination across 
firms represents the situation where a manager faces analysts with the same recommendations on the firm 
(i.e., no dispersion in analysts’ forecasts).  Discrimination in this setting would imply that the manager facing 
analysts with unanimously unfavorable views would allow less participation from analysts following the firm 
than the manager facing analysts with unanimously favorable views of the firm.  Results are not sensitive to 
this design choice, as documented in the sensitivity tests. 
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prediction that β5>0.  Additionally, if there is a fixed supply of time for questions, the more 
analysts there are covering the firm, the less likely it is that any individual analyst will ask 
a question.  This implies a negative relation between the probability of participation and 
the number of I/B/E/S analysts, NumAnalyst, covering the firm (β6<0).   
In addition to participation constraints, an individual analyst’s quality should 
increase both the analyst’s desire to participate and the manager’s decision to allow such 
participation.10  Controlling particularly for an analyst’s desire to participate is critical for 
drawing correct inferences with respect to the analyst’s view of the firm.  Because I do not 
have data that identifies with certainty the analysts who attempted to participate, my 
empirical tests are ultimately joint tests of both the discrimination hypothesis and tests of 
analyst’s participation desire.  In regression model (1) I attempt to rule out analyst 
participation as a competing hypothesis by including control variables for analyst quality, 
which should correlate with their unobservable desire to participate.   
I define analyst quality as a combination of an analyst’s ability, experience and 
effort.  Prior research shows that these characteristics determine forecast accuracy 
(Clement 1999) and the extent that the analyst will search for private information that 
results in bold earnings forecasts (Clement and Tse 2005).  I assume these same 
characteristics proxy for analyst quality in providing information-intermediary services to 
the market.   
                                                 
10 Poor-quality analysts may expose their quality type on the conference call if they ask a question, and 
therefore may avoid speaking publicly out of concern for their own careers.  Of course, the market could 
infer their quality type to some extent by noting their non-participation, but the poor-quality analyst is 
unlikely to facilitate the revelation process by directly exposing themselves.  Likewise, managers acting in 
the best interest of the shareholders would not want to waste time with poor quality analysts, whose questions 
could potentially confuse investors or take time away from answering more pertinent questions.   
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To capture the firm-specific variation in analyst characteristics, which should 
influence management’s selection of participating analysts, I scale each of the continuous 
characteristic variables to range from 0 to 1 using a transformation that preserves the 
relative distances among each characteristic’s measures for firm j  in quarter t .11  Doing 
so also allows for ease of comparison of regression coefficients across analyst 
characteristics and straightforward use of the odds ratio for interpreting logistic regression 














where high tjisticCharacteri ,,  values indicate that analyst i  scores high on that 
characteristic relative to other analysts who follow firm j  in quarter t .   
   If managers choose the high quality analysts and high quality analysts have a 
higher propensity to attempt to participate, then analysts who are research all-stars 
(AllStar), analysts who were relatively more accurate in predicting the firm’s prior quarter 
earnings (PriorAcc), analysts with relatively more general (GenExp) and firm specific 
experience (FirmExp), analysts who provide relatively more forecasts of earnings 
(ForFreq) and analysts with relatively more resources available to them (BrokerSize) 
should all have a higher probability of being on the call.12  These predictions should 
manifest as  β7>0, β8>0, β9>0, β10>0, β12>0 and β13>0.  On the contrary, analysts who 
cover relatively more industries (Inds) and firms (Companies) develop less expertise and 
                                                 
11 For example, if a manager is interested in entertaining questions from the most experienced analyst, he will 
choose the most experienced analyst from the group of analysts that follow the firm.  The experience level of 
that analyst relative to the entire cross-section of analysts is less likely to influence the manager’s 
participation choices.   
12 See Appendix 1 for more complete variable descriptions.  
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have less time to expend with respect to any particular firm.  These analysts should be less 
likely to participate on the call, which would yield β11<0 and β14<0.   
The relationship an individual analyst has with firm management should also 
influence the probability of participation on the conference call.  I proxy for this 
unobservable relationship by identifying whether the analyst has participated on a firm’s 
conference call in the past (OnCallPrior) and expect β15>0.  Finally, as modeled by Hayes 
(1998) and empirically demonstrated by McNichols and O’Brien (1997), analysts are 
likely to lose interest and gather less information in stocks for which they hold unfavorable 
views.  If interest in a stock is correlated with the level of the stock recommendation, 
failure to control for such interest could yield spurious inferences regarding discrimination.  
To the extent interest is not controlled for via the previously discussed analyst quality 
variables, I include the period of time since the analyst made his/her stock recommendation 
(RecHorizon).  I assume that the more stale the recommendation, the higher the probability 
the analyst has dropped coverage and will not be seeking participation on the conference 
call.  This implies β16<0.   
To summarize, equation (1) models the determinants of conference call 
participation.  Evidence on discrimination as posited in H1 is assessed by comparing the 
coefficients on stock recommendation levels, while controlling for other determinants of 
conference call participation.   
2.4 Results for H1 
Descriptive and Univariate Results 
 Table 2 Panel A provides general descriptive statistics at the firm level.  The 
average firm has total assets of $11.4 billion, a market capitalization of $6.0 billion, a 
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market to book ratio of 3.6 and a median quarterly return on assets of about 1 percent.  
Institutions hold an average of 58.8 percent of the firm’s outstanding stock and managerial 
stock option wealth changes by an average of $519,000 for a 1 percent change in stock 
price.  There is substantial variation in each of the measures, consistent with the sample 
representing of a broad cross-section of firms, managers, and institutional influence.   
 Turning to conference call characteristics, the median number of corporate 
participants (CorpCount) is 3, which are typically the CFO, CEO and Director of Investor 
Relations.  At the median, managers take questions from 9 non-corporate participants 
(NonCorpCount).13  The number of I/B/E/S analysts covering the firm (NumAnalyst) 
ranges from 3 to 10 between the first and third quintiles, with 6 analysts covering the firm 
at the median.  Three I/B/E/S analysts (IBESonCall) participate on the median conference 
call, with an interquartile range from 2 to 6. Eighty-eight percent of all conference calls 
have at least one I/B/E/S analyst participating (IBESonCallDum).  Conference calls last an 
average of 52 minutes, and vary from about 40 minutes to just over an hour at the first and 
third quartiles.  On average, 55 percent of the call is dedicated to answering questions from 
analysts (Open).       
The average stock recommendation of the I/B/E/S analysts following the firm 
(MarketRec) is 2.42, compared with 2.32 for the I/B/E/S analysts who are actually allowed 
to participate on the conference call (OnCallRec).  Since I/B/E/S codes strong buy 
recommendations at 1 and strong sell at 5, larger average recommendation values are less 
favorable.  Thus, consistent with managerial discrimination, the average stock 
                                                 
13 Non-corporate participants include I/B/E/S analysts who cover the firm, other I/B/E/S analysts who do not 
cover the firm directly, non-I/B/E/S sell-side analysts, bankers, institutional investors, and occasionally 
individual investors. 
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recommendation of the analysts participating on the call are more favorable than the 
underlying market recommendation of all analysts (t = 26.77, p<.001).  
The first two columns of Panel A of Table 3 provide descriptive evidence on the 
pooled sample of analysts.  On average, 38 percent of analysts participate on a conference 
call (OnCall), and 58 percent of analysts participated on a prior conference call 
(OnCallPrior).  The most common stock recommendation is hold, followed by buy, strong 
buy, sell and strong sell.  The distribution of stock recommendation levels is consistent 
with other research (Chen and Matsumoto 2005, Barber et al. 2005).   
The remaining columns of Table 3 group analysts by whether they participated on 
the conference call or not.  H1 posits that managers will allow analysts with more 
favorable recommendations on the call.  Consistent with this notion, analysts who 
participate on the call have statistically higher (lower) percentages of buy and strong buy 
(sell and strong sell) recommendations.  Participating analysts are generally of higher 
quality.  In particular, participating analysts are statistically more often all-star analysts 
(AllStar = 22 percent vs 15 percent), have better relative prior forecasting accuracy 
(PriorAcc 0.71 vs 0.69), have relatively more firm-specific experience (FirmExp = 0.48 vs 
0.45), make relatively more frequent forecasts (ForFreq = 0.44 vs 0.41), and are employed 
by relatively larger brokerage houses (BrokerSize = 0.36 vs. 0.33).  Additionally, 
participating analysts have issued their recommendations more recently (RecHorizon = 
274 vs. 313) and have been on prior conference calls more frequently (PriorOnCall = 81 
percent vs. 45 percent).   
These descriptive comparisons are also consistent with the correlations in Table 3 
Panel B.  In particular, the Spearman rank correlations show that being on a conference 
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call is positively associated with the analyst’s view of the firm as proxied by stock 
recommendation levels (IBESRec, ρ =-0.085, p<.001).14  Being on a call is positively 
related to how much time is allotted to taking questions (Open, ρ =0.17, p<.001) and 
negatively related to how many analysts compete for management’s time 
(NumAnalyst, ρ =-0.087, p<.001).   Participating on the call is positively associated with 
high quality analyst characteristics like being an all-star (AllStar, ρ =0.087, p<.001), being 
a better earnings forecaster (PriorAcc, ρ =0.041, p<.001), forecasting more frequently 
(ForFreq, ρ =0.050, p<.001), having more firm experience (FirmExp, ρ =0.041, p<.001), 
having more general experience (GenExp, ρ =0.014, p<.001), and working for a larger 
brokerage house (BrokerSize, ρ =0.057, p<.001).   
Contrary to expectations, the number of companies followed by the analyst is 
increasing in conference call participation (Companies, ρ =0.015, p<.001).  Consistent with 
expectations, an analyst’s prior conference call participation is positively associated with 
current conference call participation (OnCallPrior, ρ =0.355, p<.001), and participation is 
decreasing in the staleness of the recommendation (RecHorizon, ρ =-0.092, p<.001).   
Combined, the univariate relations in both panels of Table 3 are generally 
consistent with the H1 and the related predicted differences with respect to analyst 
characteristics.  However, the univariate differences across stock recommendations and 
correlations coefficients are not particularly large.  To better assess economic significance 
                                                 
14 The correlation between conference call participation and stock recommendations is negative because 
I/B/E/S codes the most favorable recommendations (strong buy) as 1 and the most unfavorable 
recommendations (strong sell) as 5.  So, higher values of IBESRec are less favorable, and participation is 
increasing the favorableness of the stock recommendation when the correlation is negative. 
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and lend credence to the univariate evidence while controlling for other factors, I turn to 
the multiple logistic regression analysis.  
Multivariate Results 
Table 4 Panel A provides the regression results, and shows the model has 
reasonable fit with a pseudo R2 of 14.9 percent and 70.0% correct classification rate.15  
Consistent with the concerns of the SEC and analysts, the probability that an analyst 
participates on the conference call is increasing in the stock recommendation.  The 
coefficient estimates on the stock recommendations represent the incremental probability 
of conference call participation relative to a hold recommendation.  Both SBuy (0.500, p 
<.001) and Buy (0.356, p <.001) are significantly positive, with strong buy 
recommendations increasing the probability of participation more than buy 
recommendations (difference = 0.144, p <.001).  Similarly, SSell (-0.274, p <.001) and Sell 
(-0.174, p <.001) are significantly negative, with strong sell recommendations decreasing 
the probability of participation more than sell recommendations (difference = 0.100, p = 
0.060).   Using odds ratios to interpret the difference between strong sell and strong buy 
recommendations, an analyst with a strong buy recommendation has participation odds 
more than twice )17.2( )274.0500.0()( 41 == +− ee ββ  those of an analyst with a strong sell 
recommendation. 
To provide more intuition for the economic magnitude of this effect, Panel B of 
Table 4 plots the marginal probability effects of stock recommendations for two types of 
analysts.  The first type of analyst (Type 1) has sample average characteristics on all 
                                                 
15 The calculation of correctly classified observations assumes each analyst has an equal probability of 
participating versus not participating.  Using the sample average of a 38.1 percent chance of participation 
yields a correct classification percentage of 68.6 percent.  Additionally, the area under the receiver operator 
characteristic (ROC) curve for the estimation of model (1) is .753, suggesting reasonable predictive power.  
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continuous variables, was not an all-star analyst (AllStar=0), and participated on a 
previous conference call of the firm (OnCallPrior=1).  The predicted participation 
probability for a Type 1 analyst with a strong sell recommendation is 39 percent, and 
jumps 19 percentage points to 58 percent for holding a strong buy recommendation.  The 
upward slope of the graph shows the probability of participation is increasing in the stock 
recommendation of the analyst.  The largest change in predicted probability results when 
stock recommendations change from hold to buy compared to changes in any other 
adjacent levels.   
A second type of analyst (Type 2) is exactly the same as the first type, but is an all-
star analyst (AllStar=1).  The pattern is similar to the first type of analyst, however the 
Type 2 analyst is rewarded for all-star status by having a higher predicted participation 
probability of about 10 percent across all stock recommendation levels.  A strong sell 
recommendation yields a predicted participation probability of 49 percent, which is 19 
percent lower than the 68 percent probability for a strong buy recommendation.   
All other regression coefficients are statistically significant in the predicted 
direction except the coefficient on GenExp, which is significantly negative, suggesting that 
analysts with relatively more general experience have a lower probability of participating 
on the conference call.  Perhaps analysts with lots of general experience need less direct 
information from management or have established reputations that do not benefit at the 
margin from sparring with management during the conference call.   
As expected, an analyst has a better chance of getting on the conference call when 
firms dedicate more time to answering analyst questions (Open=2.131, p<.001) and when 
there are fewer analysts competing for management’s time (NumAnalyst=-0.031, 
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p<.001).16  The participation odds are more than five times higher for analysts who 
previously participated on a conference call compared to those who did not, suggesting 
that a prior relationship with management is very important in obtaining access to the call.  
With respect to analyst quality, the most accurate analyst has 1.321 times (p<.001) higher 
participation odds than the least accurate analyst.  More firm experience, more forecast 
frequency, working for a larger brokerage house and covering fewer companies all 
increase the odds of being on the conference call.  These results are consistent with both 
firms allowing the highest quality analysts to participate on the conference call and with 
low quality analysts not seeking participation.   
Sensitivity Tests 
 Analyst favorableness on a relative basis.  Equation (1) captures discrimination 
within and across firms by using indicator variables for analyst stock recommendation 
levels.   To isolate the within firm effects, I measure analyst stock recommendations 
relative to other analysts following the firm, (RelRec) and re-estimate equation (1).  As 
shown in Table 5, the coefficient on RelRec is a significantly positive 0.460.  This implies 
that the most favorable analyst following the firm has participation odds 1.58 times higher 
than the least favorable analyst.  These results yield similar inferences to those reported in 
Table 4, although the ability to compare differences across specific stock recommendation 
levels is removed.   
 Differences model for correlated omitted variables.  Equation (1) potentially 
suffers from unknown or unmeasurable correlated omitted variables.  To the extent such 
variables are constant over time, estimating a differences version of equation (1) by fiscal 
quarter helps alleviate the correlated omitted variables problem.  To estimate a differences 
                                                 
16 Inferences are unchanged if the raw number of question and answer minutes is used instead of Open. 
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model, I identify the subsample of consecutive quarterly conference calls so that current 
and prior conference call participation can be measured for each analyst.  I then require the 
analyst to make a recommendation change or reiteration during the period between the 
current and prior quarter conference call.   This sampling procedure yields a total of 16,535 
analyst-firm-quarter observations, comprised of 7,501 analysts who did participate on the 
prior period conference call (OnCalli,j,t-1=1), and 9,034 who did not participate on the prior 
period conference call (OnCalli,j,t-1=0).  I then estimate the following model in order to 
assess how recommendation changes in the form of upgrades and downgrades impact the 

















    (1a) 
where s is either the (OnCalli,j,t-1=0) sample or the (OnCalli,j,t-1=1) sample, Upgrades are 
indicator variables for each of the ten potential types of upgrades (i.e., SSell to Sell, Sell to 
Hold, etc.), Downgrades are indicator variables for each potential type of downgrade, 
NumAnalyst and Open are as previously defined, and analyst-firm-quarter subscripts are 
omitted for brevity.  Analyst characteristic variables are not included because they are not 
expected to change from quarter to quarter, yielding differences of zero.  No explicit 
control is included for the staleness of recommendation (which proxies for analyst interest 
in the stock) because both recommendation changes and reiterations must occur within the 
approximate three month period between consecutive quarterly earnings conference calls. 
If upgrades (downgrades) are pleasing (displeasing) to managers, then upgrades 
(downgrades) should increase (decrease) the participation probability.  Since 
recommendation reiterations (i.e., confirmed no-change recommendations) are the base 
case, discrimination would imply positive (negative) coefficients on 1β  ( 11β ) through 10β  
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( 20β ).  As before, time and participation constraints should yield negative (positive) 
coefficients on NumAnalyst (Open). 
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 8.  Across both analyst subsamples, 
all statistically significant coefficients are as expected, consistent with managers rewarding 
(punishing) analysts who upgrade (downgrade).  However, there are two key exceptions.  
First, among the set of analysts who did not participate on the prior conference call, 
upgrades from SSell to Hold decrease the analysts’ participation probability relative to a 
reiterating analyst.  In fact, only upgrades the ultimately result in recommendation levels 
above Hold please management enough to warrant statistically significant increased 
conference call access.   
Second, across both subsets of analysts, downgrades from SBuy to Buy increase the 
analyst’s participation probability relative to a reiterating analyst.  Thus, downgrading 
analysts can retain preferential conference call access so long as the ultimate 
recommendation level remains above a Hold.  The apparent importance of the Hold 
recommendation level as a threshold for both upgrade and downgrade importance is 
consistent with Panel B of Table 4.  There, the largest participation probability increases 
(decreases) obtain when analyst recommendation levels move above (down to) the Hold 
recommendation.   
Combined, these results generally suggest that managers discriminate based on 
recommendation changes, but also that all upgrades (downgrades) are not equally pleasing 
(displeasing) to managers.  These findings are inconsistent with Chen and Matsumoto’s 
(2005) conclusions that managers do not discriminate based on analyst upgrades and 
downgrades in the post-FD period.     
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Using indicator variables for each type of upgrade and downgrade results in sparse 
population for some recommendation change combinations.  As a result, insignificant 
results on some recommendation change combinations in Panel A of Table 6 could result 
from low power.  To provide further support for the overall assertion that positive 
(negative) recommendation changes result in more (less) conference call access, I calculate 
a continuous recommendation change variable for each observation as RecChange = 
Recommendationi,j,t.- Recommendationi,j,t-1 where Recommendation equals 5 for strong 
buy, 4 for buy, 3 for hold, 2 for sell and 1 for strong sell.  Thus, upgrades have positive 
values and downgrades have negative values.  I then replace all upgrade and downgrade 
indicator variables equation (1a) with the continuous recommendation change measure.  If 
upgrades (downgrades) increase (decrease) the probability of participating, I expect a 
positive relation positive relation between the recommendation change and participation.  
Panel B of Table 6 reveals results consistent with this expectation.  In particular, I obtain 
positive and significant recommendation change coefficients in both subsamples, 
consistent with managerial discrimination. 
Insufficient control for analyst interest in the firm.  In Panel A of Table 4, the 
variable RecHorizon is significantly negative (-.001, p<.001) as expected, suggesting that 
the more stale the recommendation, the less likely an analyst is to participate.17  
RecHorizon attempts to control for analyst interest in the stock, which is important to the 
extent that interest is correlated with stock recommendations (McNichols and O’Brien 
1997, Hayes 1998).  To provide further assurance that lack of interest in the stock does not 
drive the main discrimination results, I re-estimate equation (1) using only the 98,174 
                                                 
17 Similar results obtain when I use the staleness of the analyst’s outstanding quarterly earnings forecast 
instead of stock recommendation. 
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analyst-firm-quarter observations where an earnings forecast was issued subsequent to the 
conference call.  This increases the likelihood that the analyst was interested in the stock at 
the most recent conference call.  Results (not reported) are consistent with Table 4.  The 
probability of participating remains increasing in the stock recommendation, and strong 
buy recommendation analysts have participation odds double those of the strong sell 
recommendation analysts.18   
 Lack of independence across observations.  The observations used to estimate 
equation (1) in Table 4 come from a pooled cross-section where individual observations 
are not independent.  The standard errors used for test statistics are robustly estimated and 
are clustered by firm, under the assumption that firm characteristics and managerial actions 
will impact analyst participation.  Thus, the standard errors allow for a lack of 
independence across analysts covering a given firm, and assume independence across 
groups of analysts by firm.  Despite the firm clustering, the pooled cross-section still 
contains multiple observations of the same firm, which violates the independence 
assumption.  To address this potential problem, I re-estimate equation (1) using the Fama 
MacBeth (1973) procedure. I estimate Equation (1) separately by calendar-quarter thereby 
ensuring that only one firm is represented in the cross section.  Then, I average the 
coefficients and generate a t-statistic from the individual calendar quarter coefficients.  
Results, reported in column B of Table 7 are very similar to those reported in Table 4 in 
significance and magnitude, with the exception BrokerSize (GenExp), which are both 
insignificant at conventional levels.  Additionally, the coefficients on SBuy, Buy, Sell, and 
SSell are of the predicted sign (statistically significant) in 12 (12), 12 (12), 10 (6), and 11 
                                                 
18 If discrimination results in unfavorable analysts dropping coverage after the conference call, this sampling 
procedure would result in lower variation in the outstanding recommendations at the time of the conference 
call, which biases against finding support for the discrimination hypothesis.  
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(7) of the quarterly regressions, respectively.  These results suggest the results in Table 4 
are not driven by any individual fiscal quarter.   
Another potential lack of independence results from having multiple observations 
of the same analyst in the cross section and over time.  To assess whether this possibility 
affects any inferences, I re-estimate equation (1) again using the Fama MacBeth (1973) 
procedure and randomly select one observation for each analyst in the calendar quarter 
cross section.  This estimation procedure results in calendar quarter samples with unique 
firm-analyst combinations, removing independence concerns at both the firm and analyst 
level.  Results, reported in Column A of Table 7 are consistent with those presented in 
Table 4, except that the coefficient on GenExp, FirmExp and BrokerSize are insignificant.  
The model has similar average explanatory power and the strong buy recommendation 
analysts retain participation odds more than double those of the strong sell 
recommendation analysts.    
Managerial preferences for pessimistic earnings forecasts.  Ke and Yu (2005) 
provide results consistent with managers rewarding analysts who provide pessimistic 
forecasts prior to the earnings announcement.  If pessimistic analysts tend to have 
unfavorable forecasts, the previous results could be driven by the failure to account for the 
pessimism in analyst earnings forecasts.  To assess whether forecast pessimism is a 
correlated omitted variable, I follow Ke and Yu (2005) and add to equation (1) a variable 
that equals 1 if the analyst’s most recent outstanding quarterly earnings forecast is below 
the consensus forecast, and zero otherwise.  Results (not reported) show that adding this 
variable has a negligible effect on the magnitude and significance of the coefficients 
reported in Table 4 and inferences remain unchanged.  However, the pessimism logit 
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coefficient is positive and significant (0.139, p<.001), implying that pessimistic analysts 
are more likely to participate on conference calls compared to other analysts.  These results 
are consistent with Ke and Yu (2005), although the effects of forecast pessimism on the 
odds of participating are an order of magnitude lower than the effects of strong buy or 
strong sell recommendations.   
2.5  Effect of managerial incentives and analyst reliance on management on 
discrimination extent 
Research Design and Variable Development for H2 and H3 
The previous section provides evidence consistent with the existence of managerial 
discrimination among analysts.  Estimation of equation (1) provides evidence on the 
average extent of discrimination by assessing the difference between the coefficients on 
SBuy and SSell.  If discrimination truly results from managerial actions, as opposed to 
analyst’s differential propensity to seek access, the extent of managerial discrimination 
should vary in predictable ways.  In particular, as stated in H2 (H3), managers should 
discriminate more when they have the higher incentives for high stock prices (when 
analysts rely heavily on them for information). 
To assess the impact of managerial incentives (analyst reliance) on the extent of 
discrimination, I re-estimate equation (1) separately by quintile of managerial incentives 
(analyst reliance).  Doing so allows the coefficients in equation (1) to vary across levels of 
managerial incentives (analyst reliance).  To statistically assess whether the extent of 
discrimination differs between the lowest and highest quintile of managerial incentives 
















r                  (2) 
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where q  is the incentive quintile of the manager (analyst reliance quintile of the analyst) 
and xr  is the vector of non-stock recommendation level variables and analyst-firm-quarter 
subscripts are omitted for brevity.   
If managers discriminate between SBuy and SSell analysts more (less) when they 
have high (low) incentives to maintain high stock prices then H2 predicts 
)()( 4141
HighHighLowLow ββββ −<− .  The differential treatment of analysts could be driven by 
either rewarding SBuy analysts, in which case )( 11
HighLow ββ < , and/or retaliation against 
SSell analysts, in which case )( 44
HighLow ββ > .  Similarly, if managers discriminate more 
(less) when analyst reliance is high (low), then H3 also predicts 
)()( 4141
HighHighLowLow ββββ −<−  driven by )( 11
HighLow ββ <  and/or )( 44
HighLow ββ > . 
I operationalize managerial incentives for high stock prices when testing H2 
through CEO option wealth sensitivities to stock prices.  Prior literature suggests managers 
with high option wealth sensitivities to stock prices take actions to increase accruals in an 
attempt to maintain high stock prices (Cheng and Warfield, 2005).  If discrimination 
among analysts is another mechanism to keep stock prices high, the discrimination should 
be more pronounced when managers have higher option wealth sensitivity to stock prices.  
I measure option wealth sensitivity via Execucomp as the change in the CEO’s option 
wealth sensitivity for a 1 percent change in stock price (Core and Guay, 2002).  
I proxy for analyst reliance on management using the extent of institutional 
holdings.  Institutional investors rely on sell-side analysts to provide unique firm-specific 
information, and survey evidence shows that institutions highly value a sell-side analyst’s 
ability to access company management (Johnson, 2005).  Institutions reward analysts that 
provide them key valuation inputs with commission generating order flow.  Since 
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managers understand the pressure analysts face to please institutional clients, managers 
should discriminate more when institutional holdings are high.19  I measure institutional 
holdings (InstHold) as of the most recent calendar quarter prior to the firm’s fiscal quarter 
end. 
Results for H2 and H3 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results with respect to H2 on managerial incentives.  
Panel A shows that the difference between Sbuy and SSell for managers with the highest 
wealth sensitivity is greater than the difference for managers with the lowest wealth 
sensitivity (difference = 0.405, p = 0.044).  The graph shows that the increase in 
discrimination is driven primarily by managers preventing questions from strong sell 
analysts as opposed to catering differentially to strong buy analysts.  In particular, the 
difference between strong sell analysts in the high and low incentive conditions is 
statistically different than zero (difference = -0.423, p = 0.027).   The treatment of strong 
buy analysts is roughly constant across the high and low incentive conditions, and the 
difference is not statistically significant (difference = -0.019, p = 0.830).   
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results with respect to H3 regarding analyst reliance 
on management for information.  Panel B shows that the difference between Sbuy and 
SSell for analysts who rely most heavily on management is greater than the difference for 
analysts that rely least on management for information (difference = 0.288, p = 0.061).  
The graph shows that the increase in discrimination is driven primarily through catering 
more heavily to strong buy analysts (difference = 0.189, p = 0.003).  Retaliation against 
                                                 
19 The indirect effects of institutions on a manager’s propensity to discriminate are unclear.  If institutions act 
as monitors and view discrimination as a sign of deeper managerial problems detrimental to firm value, they 
may act as a deterrent to discrimination.  On the other hand, if institutions are on average short-sale 
constrained, they have incentives to keep the stock prices of their holdings high just like managers do.  In 
such a case they would welcome discrimination. 
 35 
strong sell analysts plays some role in the overall discrimination difference (difference =    
-0.099), but the differential treatment of strong sell analysts across conditions is not 
statistically significant (p = 0.291).   
Together, the H2 and H3 results confirm the earlier conclusion that managers 
discriminate by showing that discrimination varies in predictable ways with respect to 
managerial incentives for high stock prices and the analyst’s need to rely on management 
for information.20  Interestingly, in both panels of Table 8, discrimination still exists even 
when incentives and management reliance are low.   
2.6  Discrimination conditional on participating on the conference call 
Previous sections have attempted to rule out the competing hypothesis that 
discriminatory evidence obtains from a failure to control for analyst propensity to seek 
conference call participation.  To completely rule out this possibility, this section 
investigates the treatment of analysts who have been allowed call participation, which 
ensures an analyst’s interest in the stock at the time of the conference call.  If managers 
discriminate based on analyst stock recommendations, evidence should exist even among 
those analysts participating on the conference call.  Such differential analyst treatment 
might include pushing unfavorable analysts further down the question queue or speaking to 
the favorable (unfavorable) analyst more (less) during the conference call.   
Question Queue Discrimination 
Managers can discriminate among analysts by explicitly allowing (denying) 
favorable (unfavorable) analyst participation.  A more subtle way to discriminate is for the 
                                                 
20 For the alternative hypothesis that analyst interest in the stock drives the observed empirical results, it 
would have to be the case that unfavorable analysts lose interest more when CEOs have high option wealth 
sensitivities and when institutional holdings are high.  It unclear why this would be the case. 
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manager to rank the queue of analysts attempting to ask a question in order from most 
favorable to least favorable and then take questions until the allotted conference call time 
expires.  Queue ordering in this manner increases (decreases) the probability that enough 
time will remain to hear a question from the favorable (unfavorable) analyst.   
To investigate whether managers manipulate the question queue as a method of 
discrimination, I estimate the following linear regression: 
Queue|OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 SBuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 SSelli,j,t                   
+  β5 AllStari,j,t  + β6  PriorAcci,j,t + β7  FirmExpi,j,t                                        
+ β8  GenExpi,j,t + β9 Indsi,j,t + β10  ForFreqi,j,t + β11  BrokerSizei,j,t   
+ β12  Companiesi,j,t + β13  PriorOnCalli,j,t + υi,t 
(2) 
where: 
Queue|OnCall The order of the analyst's first appearance on the conference call relative to all 
non-corporate conference call participants.  Relative order is calculated as (Total 
number of non-corporate conference call participants - position of analyst on 
conference call)/(Total number of non-corporate conference call participants - 1).  
The last non-corporate participant to ask a question has a value of 0, while the 
first non-corporate participant to ask a question has a value of 1. 
  
and all other variables are as previously defined.  Equation (2) is identical to equation (1), 
with the following exceptions.  This model does not consider participation constraints 
(Open and NumAnalysts) because the sample analysts here are, by definition, participating 
on the call.  Additionally, RecHorizon is not included in the model because it is meant to 
capture the unobservable interest the analyst has in the stock.  Since the analyst participates 
on the conference call in this subsample, interest is ensured.   
The discrimination hypothesis predictions are identical to equation (1): β1>0,       
β2>0, β1>β2, β3<0, β4<0, β3>β4.  The results in Table 9 provide evidence of discrimination 
by managerial manipulation of the question queue.  In particular, the coefficients on SBuy 
(0.044, p<.001) and Buy (0.046, p<.001) are significantly positive, suggesting that strong 
buy and buy recommendation analysts are dealt with by management before analysts with 
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hold recommendations.  The opposite is true for SSell (-0.024, p<.001) and Sell analysts (-
0.017, p=.038), who are statistically lower in the question queue than hold analysts.  The 
difference between strong buy (strong sell) and buy (sell) recommendation analysts is not 
significant, but the overall tenor of the results points to discrimination increasing in the 
analysts favorableness toward the firm.21 
Duration of Manager/Analyst Interaction 
 If managers cater to the informational needs of favorable analysts more so than 
unfavorable analysts, then they should spend more conference call time with the former.  I 
assume that the time spent with an analyst sufficiently proxies for the extent of private 
information transfer from the manager to the analyst, and investigate whether the amount 
of time spent on the call varies with the analyst’s view of the firm.  I estimate the following 
linear regression: 
Time|OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 SBuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 SSelli,j,t + β5 UPi,j,t  
             + β6  DNi,j,t  +  β7 AllStari,j,t  + β8  PriorAcci,j,t + β9  FirmExpi,j,t              
+ β10  GenExpi,j,t + β11 Indsi,j,t + β12  ForFreqi,j,t + β13  BrokerSizei,j,t   
+ β14  Companiesi,j,t + β15  PriorOnCalli,j,t + υi,t 
(3) 
where: 
Time|OnCall The number of minutes managers spend answering questions of the analyst, 
measured as the number of words spoken to the analyst divided by 150, where 
150 is the word count per minute conversion 
  
and all other variables are as previously defined.  Equation (3) is identical to equation (2) 
expect for the change in the dependent variable.  Consistent with the discrimination 
hypothesis in previous sections, I expect β1>0, β2>0, β1>β2, β3<0, β4<0, and β3>β4.  Table 
10 provides the estimation of equation (3). 
                                                 
21 Inferences are unchanged if equation (2) is estimated using the Fama MacBeth (1973) procedure. 
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 The results in Table 10 suggest that analysts with strong buy and buy 
recommendations are allotted more conference call time than hold analysts.  In particular, 
the coefficients on SBuy (0.174, p<.001) and Buy (0.114, p<.001) are significantly positive.  
Sell analysts are not treated significantly differently than the base case hold analyst, but, 
contrary to predictions, strong sell analysts are spoken to more than the hold analysts 
(0.135, p = 0.06).  In fact, the difference in time managers spend with strong sell analysts 
and strong buy analysts is not statistically significant.  Combined, these results are 
consistent with both managers catering to favorable analysts, and once making the decision 
to speak with an extremely unfavorable analyst, to debate heavily with them.22   
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides compelling direct evidence that managers discriminate 
among analysts during earnings conference calls.  Using a large dataset of earnings 
conference call transcripts from 2002 to 2004, I find that the probability of an analyst 
being allowed to ask a question during an earnings conference call is increasing in the 
favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm.  After controlling for other factors, the 
odds of an analyst with a strong buy recommendation participating on the conference call 
are more than twice as high as an analyst with a strong sell recommendation.  The extent of 
discrimination is more (less) pronounced when managers have higher (lower) incentives to 
maintain high stock prices, and when analysts are more (less) reliant on management as an 
information source.  I also show that, even among the analysts allowed to participate on the 
conference call, discrimination persists.  In particular, the order in which managers accept 
questions from analysts is increasing in the favorableness of the analyst’s stock 
recommendation.   
                                                 
22 Inferences are identical when estimating equation (3) using the Fama MacBeth (1973) procedure. 
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Detecting managerial discrimination through conference call participation requires 
careful controls for an analyst’s propensity to seek participation.  Thus, the inferences 
drawn here are only as valid as the effectiveness of such controls.  However, the results 
consistently provide evidence of managerial discrimination across a number of control 
specifications. 
By measuring discrimination directly using earnings conference call transcripts, I 
add to the empirical literature on discrimination, where results are mixed perhaps because 
of reliance on indirect discrimination proxies.  My results validate prior anecdotal and 
survey evidence suggesting that managers discriminate among analysts, and provide 
evidence on a specific type of discrimination that is currently of concern to legislators (Cox 
2005).   
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Chapter 3:  Managerial Discrimination among Analysts                                             
and the Market Reaction to Earnings News 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates the association between the market reaction to quarterly 
earnings news and managerial conference call discrimination among analysts.  I consider 
the possibility that the scrutiny of the questions analysts pose to managers during earnings 
conference calls decreases in the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm.  Under 
such a scenario, managerial discrimination – the act of granting (thwarting) conference call 
participation to favorable (unfavorable) analysts – is more likely to result in conference 
calls that highlight (suppress) positive (negative) aspects of the firm.  Discrimination could 
therefore make good (bad) earnings news look better than (not as bad as) it really is.  
Understanding how investors view earnings news in the presence of discrimination is 
important because regulators and the SEC have recently voiced concerns that 
discrimination during earnings conference calls may ultimately mislead investors (Cox 
2005).   
I investigate the association between discrimination and the market reaction to 
earnings news in two steps.  I first utilize a random sample of 125 conference call 
manager-analyst dialogs to ascertain whether the scrutiny of analyst questions varies with 
the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm.  It is this necessary condition that 
allows discrimination to become a managerial tool to control the scrutiny managers face 
during the conference call, and potentially influence market reactions to earnings news.   
I find that, on average, question scrutiny is decreasing in the favorableness of the 
analyst’s view of the firm.  That is, more favorable analysts ask less scrutinizing questions.  
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However, this effect only exists for firms that meet or beat expected earnings.  When firms 
miss earnings targets, favorable analysts become just as scrutinizing as unfavorable 
analysts.  This shift in scrutiny is consistent with the survey evidence in Graham et al. 
(2005) suggesting managers wish to avoid missing earnings targets because of the 
enhanced level of analyst scrutiny. 
I then classify conference calls as discriminating (non-discriminating) when the 
ratio of the recommendation consensus of analysts participating on the conference call is 
more (less) favorable than the recommendation consensus of all analysts covering the firm.    
Discrimination (non-discrimination) proxies for the scrutiny (lack of scrutiny) placed on 
managers during the question and answer session of the conference call.  I examine the 
market reaction to large and small good news earnings and large and small bad news 
earnings in the presence and absence of discrimination.   
I find that the market reaction to large magnitude good news earnings is amplified 
when the manager discriminates, potentially consistent with regulatory concerns.  I find no 
discrimination effects with respect to small magnitude good news earnings.  The market 
reaction to both large and small magnitude bad earnings news is also invariant to the 
conference call discrimination level, consistent with the lack of a relation between question 
scrutiny and the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm when a firm misses 
earnings targets.   
The regulatory perspective on discrimination interprets a positive incremental 
market reaction to good news earnings as unsophisticated investors being fooled into over-
reacting to good news earnings.  Further investigation of the regulatory perspective reveals 
that the effect of discrimination on the market reaction to large good news earnings is not 
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concentrated among unsophisticated investors, but instead is equally prevalent for both 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.  Additionally, good news firms that 
discriminate exhibit less post earnings announcement drift than non-discriminating firms.  
This implies that, on average, discrimination assists the market in digesting the 
implications of good earnings news as opposed to assisting the manager in overselling 
those implications.   
The results presented here add to the literature in a number of ways.  First, it 
provides initial evidence on one of the potential consequences of managerial conference 
call discrimination.  If discrimination is a strategic choice made by managers as asserted in 
Chapter 2, assessing its impact on stock prices is an important next step that should be of 
interest to both market participants and regulators alike. 
Second, I add to the literature on strategic managerial disclosure choice in the realm 
of voluntary disclosure.  The unique managerial choice variable in this setting is the 
audience with which the manager will interact, as opposed to the strategic placement of 
favorable voluntary information (Schrand and Walther 2000) or optimistic language in an 
earnings press release (Davis et al. 2006).  More specifically, my investigation of 
discrimination directly adds to the conference call literature, which has generally 
concluded that conference calls are effective tools for resolving uncertainty about the 
implications of earnings news (Kimbrough 2005, Tasker 1998b).  However, this literature 
has focused on the effects of hosting versus not hosting a conference call.  Since most 
firms now host conference calls, I extend this literature by investigating the effects of 
variation within conference calls on the discrimination dimension.   
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Third, I add to our understanding of the interplay between managers and sell side 
analysts in the conference call setting.  Survey evidence by Graham et al. (2005) suggests 
that one motivation for managers to beat earnings targets is to avoid analyst scrutiny 
during a conference call.  I provide direct empirical evidence validating that analyst 
behavior varies based on the earnings news.   
This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops the hypothesis relating the 
scrutiny of analyst questions with the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm.  
Sections 3 and 4 outline the empirical methodology and execute the empirical analysis to 
establish an association between question scrutiny and the analyst’s view of the firm.  
Section 5 utilizes the results of earlier sections to develop a discrimination proxy and 
describes potential conflicting effects of discrimination on earnings news.  Sections 6 and 
7 test for the effects of discrimination on earnings news.  Section 8 investigates the 
regulatory interpretation of discrimination and Section 9 concludes. 
3.2  Literature Review and Hypothesis development regarding analyst question 
scrutiny 
 
SEC and regulator interest in managerial discrimination during earnings conference 
calls ultimately stems from the concern that discrimination could lead investors to rely on 
positively biased analyst research (Cox 2005).  As discussed in Chapter 2, discrimination 
imposes additional information search costs on unfavorable analysts following the firm.  
Such an increase in information search costs either forces the unfavorable analyst to drop 
coverage or upgrade his/her view of the firm in order to gain access to key company 
information.  Either situation results in positively biased analyst views of the company 
persisting in the marketplace upon which an investor, particularly an unsophisticated 
investor, may rely. 
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The aforementioned scenario implies a sequence of events.  Managers first 
discriminate, then analysts drop coverage or upgrade their recommendation, and finally 
investment decisions are made based on the prevailing analyst view of the stock.  
However, this scenario ignores the potential real time implications of discrimination with 
respect to the interpretation of earnings news.  Discrimination by definition means that the 
manager will discuss firm prospects with, and answer questions from, the more favorable 
analysts following the firm.  If a relatively favorable analyst asks less scrutinizing 
questions of the manager than a relatively unfavorable analyst would, the conference call 
dialog may paint the firm in a more favorable light and allow the manager to highlight 
more favorable aspects of the firm.  Put another way, discrimination during earnings 
conference calls may allow the manager to discuss earnings in a “friendly” environment.  
This could lead some investors to believe that good (bad) news earnings is better than (not 
as bad as) it actually is.   
 Zuckerman (2005) provides an example of such a situation.  In a June 2005 
monthly sales press release, executives at Abercrombie & Fitch provided information 
about substantial increases in denim sales volume in response to analyst concerns raised 
during its second quarter conference call about denim growth.  However, the executives 
failed to provide information that this sales growth was accompanied by lower margins.  
At the earnings release date, both actual sales growth and the related margins were 
unveiled, leading investors to question why the company had earlier provided good news 
about sales growth without the accompanying bad news about margin deterioration.  The 
company responded that Wall Street did not ask specifically about denim margins but 
rather only about denim growth.    
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As this anecdote shows, if managers know that certain types of analysts will ask 
questions that ultimately lead to highlighting the positive aspects of the firm, dealing with 
those analysts during the conference call can help portray the firm in a more favorable 
light.  Of course, a necessary condition for such a managerial strategy is that favorable 
(unfavorable) analysts ask less (more) scrutinizing questions.  I define a scrutinizing 
question to be one that critically inspects the prospects and risks of the firm, while 
considering the manager’s predisposition to highlight (downplay) positive (negative) 
aspects of the firm.23  More scrutinizing questions should therefore be direct, tough, 
challenging, and tend to result in less positive managerial responses than less scrutinizing 
questions.   
Prior research provides little evidence on the scrutinizing nature of questions 
analysts ask of managers during earnings conference calls.  Tasker (1998a) investigates the 
questions asked by analysts following twelve technology companies in 1997 and shows 
that the questions tend to relate to items not addressed in the financial statements.  Francis 
et al. (1997) investigate the questions analysts pose to 200 corporations presenting at the 
New York Society of Security Analyst meetings.  They show that analysts ask questions 
about historical accounting information and future prospects.  Additionally, they code 
whether analyst questions were aggressive or passive and whether the manager’s answer 
was positive, neutral or negative, but do not incorporate these data into their analysis.  
                                                 
23 This assumption about manager predisposition is supported by both the literature and the conservative 
nature of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  The accounting literature provides empirical examples 
of firms highlighting the most favorable aspects of their performance through framing (Schrand and Walther 
2000) and accounting method choice (Bowen et al. 1995).  GAAP’s conservative principles governing the 
recording of assets and liabilities are grounded in the notion that managers, if given the opportunity, would 
tend to overstate (understate) assets and income (liabilities and expense).   
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Ultimately neither study explores whether question type varies with the analyst’s existing 
view of the firm.   
Whether the scrutiny of analyst questions would vary with their existing views of 
the firm is unclear and ultimately an empirical question.  On one hand, analysts have 
incentives to continually uncover new information about the firms they follow in order to 
provide valuable insights for their investor clients.  This implies that analysts would ask 
scrutinizing questions regardless of any existing stock recommendation they have 
outstanding on the firm.   
On the other hand, favorable analysts may face pressures from both managers and 
certain investor clients that would prevent them from asking scrutinizing questions.  If an 
analyst obtained access to the conference call because of a favorable outstanding stock 
recommendation as documented in Chapter 2, it is unlikely the analyst would publicly 
scrutinize the manager during the conference call and jeopardize future conference call 
access.  Additionally, the favorable analyst may have investor clients that have taken long 
positions based on the existing favorable recommendation.  These investors may threaten 
to withdraw lucrative trade commission-generating business from the analyst’s brokerage 
house if the analyst uncovers negative news about the firm (Morgenson 2006).    
Finally, question scrutiny may vary with the favorableness of the analyst’s view 
due to cognitive biases.  Aside from economic incentives, analysts may suffer from 
confirmation bias.  Confirmation bias suggests individuals will seek information consistent 
with their own priors (Arkes 1991).  Koonce and Mercer (2005) provide an example of 
such a situation, where analysts with ex ante strong buy recommendations on a stock 
subconsciously seek information supporting the strong buy recommendation, in spite of 
 47 
their incentives to provide the most accurate recommendation.  In the conference call 
setting, Montier (2005) notes that rather than asking probing questions that look to 
disconfirm their existing view, favorable analysts end up asking leading questions that 
support the outstanding stock recommendation.   
In summary, analysts are pulled in many directions.  Incentives to obtain new 
information about the firm which should result in no association between their existing 
recommendation and the scrutiny of the questions they ask.  Incentives to maintain 
managerial and client relations, coupled with confirmation bias, suggests that more 
favorable (unfavorable) analysts will ask less (more) scrutinizing questions.  Combined, 
the net effect of these incentives should yield an inverse relation between question scrutiny 
and the favorableness of the analyst’s outstanding view of the firm: 
H4:  The scrutiny of an analyst’s question is decreasing in the favorableness of the 
analyst’s view of the firm. 
Graham et al. (2005) provide survey evidence suggesting that managers believe 
analysts become more scrutinizing when the company misses quarterly earnings targets.  
The authors note that when companies “…meet the earnings target, they can devote the 
conference call to the positive aspects of the firm’s future prospects…if the company fails 
to meet the guided number, the tone of the conference call becomes negative…analysts 
begin to doubt the credibility of the assumptions underlying the current earnings number 
and the forecast of future earnings.”  To my knowledge, this survey evidence has not been 
explored empirically. 
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If these managerial survey claims are true, when a firm misses earnings, favorable 
analysts should become more scrutinizing.24  This should dampen the relation 
hypothesized in H4.  In the extreme, favorable analysts may become as scrutinizing as 
unfavorable analysts, implying that stock recommendations will not be associated with 
question scrutiny among firms that miss earnings targets.  Stated formally: 
H4a:  The inverse relation between the scrutiny of an analyst’s question and the 
favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm will be stronger for firms that meet 
or beat earnings targets compared with firms that miss earnings targets.  
3.3  Sample selection, research design and variable measurement 
 
Sample 
 The empirical analysis begins by isolating the 55,862 analyst-firm-quarter 
observations from Chapter 2 where the analyst participated on the conference call by 
asking a question.  I then retain only those observations where the firm’s average 
outstanding consensus recommendation is between 2.8 and 3.2.25  Doing so reduces the 
sample size to 8,785 observations and helps ensure two things.  First, the consensus ex ante 
view of the firm is relatively constant within the sample, which removes the potential for 
question scrutiny to be associated with consensus market views of the firm.  Second, 
variation around this particular “hold” consensus recommendation level should result in 
individual analyst observations that span the spectrum from strong sell to strong buy. 
                                                 
24 Of course, the claim in Graham et al. (2005) that “analysts become more scrutinizing when a firm misses 
earnings” could also be evidenced by both favorable and unfavorable analysts increasing their scrutiny levels.  
This would represent a mean scrutiny shift in all analysts when a firm misses earnings and would preserve 
the scrutiny difference between favorable and unfavorable analysts.  This interpretation would work against 
finding results in support of H4a.  I allow for this potential interpretation in the empirical specification by 
including an indicator variable for firms that miss earnings targets. 
25 Individual analyst recommendations are on a 5 point scale, where 1 equals strong buy, 3 equals hold, and 5 
equals strong buy.  Thus, these firms have average recommendations tightly bound around the hold.  
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 I then randomly select 25 analyst-firm-quarter observations from each of the five 
stock recommendation levels for analysis, yielding 125 manager-analyst conference call 
dialogs.  Each individual manager-analyst dialog includes both the question(s) posed by 
the analyst and the response from the manager to the question.    A random selection of 
manager-analyst dialogs from the set of 8,785 is required due to the labor intensive 
exercise of reading and coding scrutiny aspects for each manager-analyst dialog.  The 
average manager-analyst dialog in the random sample is 678 words.  At 250 words per 
page this random sample alone approaches 340 pages of double-spaced, twelve point font 
text.   
The 125 manager-analyst dialogs were then assigned equally across eighteen 
different PhD student coders.  Coders had no knowledge of the outstanding stock 
recommendation of the analyst in the manager-analyst dialog they reviewed.  Coders were 
asked to read their assigned manager-analyst dialog and provide Likert scale responses 
from 1 to 9 on various dimensions of scrutiny.  As mentioned previously, scrutinizing 
questions should be characterized by questions that are direct, tough, and challenging.  
Scrutinizing questions, compared with non-scrutinizing questions, should result in less 
positive information being discussed by the firm in answer to the analyst’s question.   
Variable definitions for each of the following Likert based variables 
(SCRUTINIZING, OPENENDED, TOUGH, CHALLENGING, and NEGNEWS), including 
the questions that induce the Likert scale response, are provided in Appendix 2.  Because 
of the subjective nature inherent in coding scrutiny aspects, linguistic software was also 
utilized to measure the level of positivity in the manager-analyst dialog.  The use of 
linguistic software trades off subjectivity benefits with costs associated with the inability to 
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account for contextual meaning across words.  The General Inquirer (GI) linguistic 
software was utilized and a detailed discussion of GI is presented in Appendix 3.   
Each of the 125 manager-analyst dialogs were read by GI to calculate the number 
of positive and negative words in the dialog.  The positivity measure, NETPOS_GI, was 
constructed consistent with Davis et al. (2006) as the difference between the number of 
positive words and the number of negative words, scaled by the total number of words in 
the manager-analyst dialog.  This measure represents the percentage of the dialog that 
contained net positive language, and can vary from between -1 and +1.  Larger positive 
(negative) values indicate more positive (negative) manager-analyst dialog.   
Research design and variable measurement for testing H4 and H4a 
To test for a relationship between the scrutiny of the analyst’s question and the 
favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm, I estimate the following OLS regression 
separately for each of the six scrutiny proxies previously defined: 
iiiiii MisscMisscPROXYSCRUTINY υββββ +×+++= )(ReRe_ 3210      (4) 
where SCRUTINY_PROXYi∈(SCRUTINIZING, OPENENDED, TOUGH, 
CHALLENGING, NEGNEWS, NETPOS_GI), and other regression variables are 
defined in Appendix 2. 
 
I use the existing outstanding stock recommendation (Rec) of the analyst 
immediately prior to the earnings conference call as a proxy for the analyst’s view of the 
firm, consistent with Chapter 2.   H4 predicts that an inverse relationship will exist 
between the scrutiny of the analyst’s questions of management and the favorableness of the 
analysts view.  As such, I expect questions that are more scrutinizing, less open-ended, 
tougher, more challenging, and lead to relatively more negative information about the firm 
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H4a posits that the inverse relation between question scrutiny and the favorableness 
of the analyst’s view will be moderated by the sign of the earnings surprise.  More 
specifically, the relationship between SCRUTINY_PROXY and Rec will be less pronounced 
when the firm misses the earnings target.  Evidence supporting this hypothesis would 
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3.4  Results for H4 and H4a 
 
Table 11 provides regression variable descriptive statistics for the random sample of 
125 manager-analyst dialogs.  By construction, the mean individual outstanding 
recommendation (Rec) is 3, consistent with the sample having equal proportions of strong 
buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell recommendations.  Each of the manually coded scrutiny 
proxies (SCRUTINIZING, OPENENDED, TOUGH, CHALLENGING, NEGNEWS), which 
take on values between 1 and 9, show a moderate level of variation.  For example, 
SCRUTINIZING has an inter-quartile range of 3 and a standard deviation of 2.262 about a 
mean of 4.576.  So, despite the small sample size, the variation in these measures should 
help improve the power of the tests. 
The variable generated by the linguistic software, NETPOS_GI, has a mean of 2.9%.  
Values greater than zero imply that the dialog generated more positive words than negative 
words.  Most values of NETPOS_GI are greater than zero, suggesting that rarely does the 
dialog reveal more negative words than positive words.  This may not be surprising given 
that managers retain control over how a question is answered.  Despite the fact that these 
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variables primarily range in the greater than zero domain, NETPOS_GI exhibits reasonable 
variation.   
Table 12 displays the correlations between the regression variables.  The correlations 
among the various scrutiny proxies suggest they are capturing a common construct, as 
intended.  Statistically significant spearman correlations show that more scrutinizing calls 
are less open-ended, tougher, more challenging, and lead to more negative dialogs between 
the manager and analyst.  Unreported factor analysis across all of the scrutiny proxies 
reveals one eigenvalue greater than 1, suggesting the collection of variables captures one 
latent factor, which I name scrutiny.   
Turning to the relation between the analyst’s view of the firm and these various 
scrutiny proxies, spearman rank correlations show that unfavorable recommendations are 
associated with more scrutinizing questions ( ρ (Rec,SCRUTINIZING)=-0.217, p = 0.015), 
tougher questions ( ρ (Rec,TOUGH)=-0.161, p = 0.073), more challenging questions 
( ρ (Rec,CHALLENGING)=-0.153, p = 0.089) and more negative dialog between the 
manager and analyst (( ρ (Rec,NETPOS_GI)=0.236, p = 0.008).  These correlations are 
consistent with H4.  The correlations between Rec and OPENENDED, and Rec and 
NEGNEWS are of the predicted sign but not significant at conventional levels. 
The multiple regression results in Table 13 provide further support for H4.  In each 
regression the association between Rec and SCRUTINY_PROXY is statistically significant 
in the predicted direction.  In particular, more favorable recommendations are associated 
with less scrutinizing ( NGSCRUTINIZI1β = -0.488, p < 0.001), more open-ended (
OPENENDED
1β = 
0.238, p < 0.084), easier ( TOUGH1β = -0.487, p < 0.001) and less challenging questions 
( GCHALLENGIN1β = -0.479, p < 0.001).  Favorable recommendations are also associated with 
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less negative ( NEGNEWS1β = -0.206, p = 0.031) and more positive (
GINETPOS _
1β = 0.003, p < 
0.001) news about the firm.   
As a group, the regressions exhibit moderate fit, with adjusted R2 values that range 
from 1.86% to 14.60%.  Unreported regression results that include additional control 
variables are individually insignificant, do not improve any model’s fit nor impact the 
inferences drawn on Rec.  Control variables considered were proxies for the firm’s 
information environment (market to book ratios and the range in analyst quarterly earnings 
forecasts) in the event that analysts are more optimistic about a firm’s prospects in poor 
information environments (Tse and Yan 2005).  Additionally, results from Chapter 2 show 
that more favorable analysts are higher in the question queue than other analysts.  Queue 
position was therefore added as a control variable to control for the potential for initial 
questions of managers tend to be less scrutinizing than later questions during the 
conference call. 
Turning to tests of H4a, Table 13 shows that the interaction between Rec and Miss 
is in the predicted direction in all six of the regressions, and statistically so in five of them.  
In particular, NGSCRUTINIZI3β = 0.446 (p = 0.063), 
TOUGH
3β = 0.665 (p < 0.001), 
GCHALLENGIN
3β = 
0.581 (p = 0.014), NEGNEWS3β = 0.341 (p = 0.072) and 
GINETPOS _
3β = -0.003 (p = 0.036), which 
implies that the association between analyst scrutiny and the favorableness of the analyst’s 
view of the firm is not as strong when the firm misses earnings targets.  In fact, F-tests 
reveal that when the firm misses earnings, the relationship between Rec and the scrutiny 
proxies statistically disappears.   
Put another way, more favorable analysts will be less scrutinizing only in situations 
where the firm meets or beats earnings.  When the firm misses earnings, even the favorable 
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analysts become scrutinizing, and they become as scrutinizing as the unfavorable analysts.  
This result represents the first empirical evidence to support the survey results of Graham 
et al. (2005) claiming that the tone of conference calls becomes negative when the firm 
misses earnings targets.26 
In unreported analysis, I utilize the one latent scrutiny factor identified in factor 
analysis as dependent variables in equation (4).  The results are consistent with those 
presented in Table 13.  In particular, the latent scrutiny factor is inversely associated the 
favorableness of the analyst’s outstanding stock recommendation.  Additionally, when the 
firm misses earnings, there is no association between the latent scrutiny factor and the 
analyst’s outstanding stock recommendation.   
To summarize, the collective results of this section suggest that manager’s 
discrimination choices at the individual analyst level can impact the scrutiny they face 
during the conference call.  Managers will be scrutinized less and be able to highlight the 
positive aspects of the firm more when they interact with favorable analysts as opposed to 
unfavorable analysts.  However, this phenomenon is asymmetric in the sign of earnings 
news.  For firms missing earnings targets, even the favorable analysts become scrutinizing. 
3.5  Interpretation of Earnings News in the Presence of Discrimination 
 
Having established in the previous section that discrimination can impact the 
scrutiny level of the conference call, I now turn to the potential effects of discrimination on 
the interpretation of earnings news.  Earnings conference calls are designed to assist the 
market in understanding the implications of current earnings news for the company’s 
                                                 
26 When I regress each scrutiny proxy on only an indicator variable for a firm missing earnings targets, I find 
that firms missing earnings encounter a statistically higher mean level of scrutiny.  Results from estimating 
equation (4) show that this average result stems from favorable analyst scrutiny becoming more like the 
unfavorable analyst as opposed to a mean shift in the scrutiny of all analysts. 
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future prospects (Francis et al. 1997, Frankel et al. 1999, Tasker 1998b, Kimbrough 2005).  
However it is not clear how discrimination might moderate the market’s interpretation of 
earnings news.  Three competing views exist on this issue. 
 First, regulators are concerned that discrimination could assist a manager in 
highlighting (downplaying) positive (negative) aspects of the firm (Cox 2005).  In the 
context of interpreting earnings news, regulator concerns would be evidenced by the 
market incorrectly reacting more positively (less negatively) to good (bad) earnings news 
in the presence of discrimination than in the absence of discrimination.  This scenario 
requires the assumption that the marginal investor cannot discern that managerial and 
analyst incentives may be aligned (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2004; Mikhail et al. 
2005) or the understanding that analysts might suffer from confirmation bias.  
 An opposing second view argues that investors are sufficiently rational and 
understand the incentives of managers and analysts, and/or cognitive biases analysts might 
suffer from.  In such a case, investors identify discrimination when it occurs and the 
standard lemons problem results (Akerlof, 1970).  Investors view conference calls where 
managers discriminate as cheap talk settings, and discount the positive news management 
provides.  Morgenson (2005) highlights this point to investors:  “Indeed, retaliation by a 
company against a straight-talking analyst should be viewed as a red-flag warning that the 
company or its executives may have something to hide.”  If one views analyst scrutiny as a 
cost, only firms with truly high quality earnings news (i.e. good news that is permanent 
and bad news that is transitory) can afford to incur it.  Therefore managers can signal the 
quality of their earnings news by not discriminating and dealing with the most unfavorable 
analysts during the conference call (Spence 1973).  Lowengard (2006) makes this precise 
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point by mentioning that managers who disagree with an unfavorable analyst should 
communicate more so with that analyst to prove the analyst view is unwarranted.  If this 
situation holds, then managers who do not discriminate should have stronger positive (less 
negative) market reactions to good and bad earnings news.   
 A third view comes from managers who make the discrimination choices.  Some 
managers may feel that unfavorable analyst views cannot be changed, despite their best 
efforts (Lowengard 2006).  In such a case, further dialog with the analyst during the 
earnings conference call uses up time that could be better spent answering questions of 
other analysts.  Additionally, if investors rationally discount any positive claims of 
managers during the conference call, managers may feel that discriminating helps give 
them more “air time” to further clarify their positive claims and thereby resolve 
uncertainty.  If this scenario is true, good (bad) earnings news accompanied by 
discrimination will actually help investors understand positive aspects of the firm that 
accompany the earnings surprise, and result in a more positive (less negative) earnings 
response to good (bad) news.27 
Whether the regulator scenario, the signaling scenario, or the manager scenario 
dominates on average is unclear ex ante.  As a result, I posit the following null hypothesis: 
H5:  The market reaction to earnings is not moderated by the discrimination level 
of the conference call.   




                                                 
27 A positive firm aspect in the presence of good (bad) news would be information explaining the permanent 
(transitory) nature of good (bad) earnings news.   
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I begin with an initial sample of 17,334 conference calls where at least one I/B/E/S 
analyst participated on the conference call by asking a question.  I then eliminate 178 firm-
quarter observations due to missing announcement period returns, market value of equity 
or market to book ratios.  I also eliminate 3,968 firm-quarter observations for which 
expected earnings is unavailable.  Unexpected earnings, as discussed in Appendix 2, 
measures expected earnings as the mean forecast of all analysts issuing earnings estimates 
within the sixty day window prior to the conference call.  Using such a strict criteria for 
expected earnings trades off losing observations for a more precise measure of expected 
earnings.  Since the focus of this section is the market reaction to earnings news, a sharp 
expected earnings measure is critical to the analysis.  The final sample is 13,188 firm-
quarter conference calls. 
Variable Measurement - Discrimination 
I measure discrimination by examining the difference between the outstanding 
recommendations held by the analysts that participate on the conference call by asking a 
question and the outstanding recommendations of all analysts following the firm on 
I/B/E/S (Recdiff).  If the average recommendation of the analysts participating on the 
conference call is more favorable than the population of analysts following the firm (i.e. 
Recdiff ≥  0), I define the call as discriminating.  The intuition is that if managers are 
strategically allowing participation based on the analyst’s view of the firm, the 
participating analysts should have more favorable outstanding stock recommendations.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, comparing the analysts that participate to the underlying 
population of analysts may lead to positive skewness in the Recdiff measure.  This can 
occur if some unfavorable analysts in the population of analysts do not seek to participate 
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on the conference call (Hayes 1998).  Thus the unobservable population of analysts that 
attempt to participate on the conference call may be actually more favorable than measured 
by Recdiff.  Empirically, this measurement error would incorrectly classify some 
conference calls as discriminating when in fact they are not.  This should add noise to the 
discrimination partition and lower the power of the tests. 
If Recdiff is capturing the notion of discrimination, then discriminating calls (i.e. 
Recdiff ≥  0) should, on average, yield less scrutinizing dialog between the manager and 
analysts.  Coding costs prohibit the manual assessment the scrutiny faced by the manager 
during the entire question and answer dialog.  However, the GI linguistic software can be 
used to provide some evidence on whether Recdiff is capturing notions of scrutiny and add 
construct validity to Recdiff.   
To provide such evidence, I first run the entire conference call question and answer 
dialog through GI and measure the number of positive and negative words for the entire 
conference call question and answer session.  I then construct NETPOS_GItran, which is 
calculated exactly as NETPOS_GI in the previous section, except now it is measured over 
the entire conference call question and answer session as opposed to the dialog between the 
manager and one analyst.  As with NETPOS_GI, more positive values of NETPOS_GItran 
proxies for less scrutinizing interaction the manager and analysts.  If discriminating 
managers face less scrutiny, then a positive relationship should exist between Recdiff and 
NETPOS_GItran.  The Spearman correlation between Recdiff and NETPOS_GItran is 
0.017 (p = .024), consistent with discrimination decreasing the scrutiny faced by the 
manager.28   
                                                 
28 This positive univariate relationship is robust to controlling for the earnings news and the outstanding 
consensus stock recommendation.  I run the following rank regression of NETPOS_GItrani,j,t  =  β0 + β1 
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Research Design and additional variable measurement 
To investigate how discrimination might moderate the market reaction to earnings 
news, I estimate the following pooled cross-sectional Newey-West robust OLS regression: 
CARi,j,t  =  β0 + β1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + β3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t                       (5) 
                       + β4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t + β5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t   
                       +β7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +β8 BNDCSmall_UEi,j,t + β9 LNMVEi,j,t  
                       + β10 BOOKMKTi,j,t + β11 RETVOLi,j,t + υi,j,t 
 
Appendix 2 describes the exact method for calculating each variable in this equation.  The 
dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative abnormal return during the three day earnings 
announcement window.  The dependent variables of interest, GNNDLarge_UE, 
GNDCLarge_UE, GNNDSmall_UE, GNDCSmall_UE, BNNDLarge_UE, 
BNDCLarge_UE, BNNDSmall_UE, and BNDCSmall_UE, represent earnings news in the 
presence or absence of discrimination for earnings partitioned on both the sign and 
magnitude of earnings news.   
I allow earnings response coefficients (ERCs) to vary by the sign of earnings for 
two reasons.  First, as documented previously, analyst scrutiny varies with the sign of 
earnings news.  When firms miss earnings even favorable analysts become scrutinizing, 
which suggests that conference calls classified as discriminating may be no different than 
conference calls classified as non-discriminating.  Second, some prior research documents 
that ERCs are asymmetric with the sign of earnings, with positive surprises having larger 
ERCs than negative surprises (Basu 1997, Defond and Park 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                    
UEi,j,t + β2 Marketreci,j,t + β3 Recdiffi,j,t + εt , where variables are defined in the Appendix 2 and each variable 
is transformed into its decile rank.  If more positive earnings news, more favorable outstanding views of the 
firm, and discrimination each yield more positive (less scrutinizing) dialog during the question and answer 
session then β1>0, β2<0, and β3>0.  Estimation of this regression yields β0 =4.280 (p<.001), β1=0.102 
(p<.001), β2=-0.065 (p<.001), and β3=0.012 (p=0.079).     
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I also allow the earnings response to vary by the magnitude of the earnings surprise 
for two reasons.  First, Freeman and Tse (1992) document a non-linearity in the returns-
earnings relation that suggests large magnitude earnings surprises tend to be viewed by the 
market as less permanent than small magnitude surprises.  I define earnings surprises as 
large when the absolute value of the earnings surprise scaled by market value is greater 
than .005 (Freeman and Tse 1992).  Second, the implications of large earnings surprises for 
firm value tend to be the most misunderstood by the market, as evidenced by post earnings 
announcement drift at both short (Bernard and Thomas 1990, Abarbanell and Bernard 
1992) and long (Doyle et al. 2005) time horizons.  If managers use discrimination to help 
them better explain the implications of their earnings news, large earnings surprises should 
represent a powerful setting to examine the impact of discrimination. 
To investigate the effects of discrimination on earnings with these varying 
characteristics, I compare the coefficients on successive pairs of earnings based dependent 
regression variables in equation (5).  For example, to examine the effects of discrimination 
on large good news earnings, I compare β1 with β2.  If discrimination has an incremental 
effect of unduly highlighting or assisting the market in understanding good news 
implications, then I expect β2 > β1.  If on the other hand managers that do not discriminate 
are incurring scrutiny costs to signal the high quality of their earnings news, I expect β1 
>β2.  A similar analysis is performed for assessing the impact of discrimination for small 
good news earnings surprises.  Again, in this setting if managers are highlighting positive 
aspects of the firm or helping the market understand positive aspects of the firm, then β4 > 
β3.  If non-discrimination is a signal then I expect β3 > β4.   
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Turning to negative earnings surprises, I compare β5 with β6 and β7 with β8.  If 
discrimination facilitates managers downplaying of large (small) bad news, or helps the 
manager explain why bad news isn’t truly that bad, then β6 (β8) should be less than β5 (β7).  
On the other hand, if non-discrimination is a signal that large (small) bad news is not really 
that indicative of a decrease in the potential cash flows of the firm, then β5 (β7) should be 
less than β6 (β8). 
Other studies find that the market reaction to earnings news is affected by firm size-
related differences in predisclosure information (Atiase 1985, Freeman 1987), and by 
growth prospects and risk (Collins and Kothari 1989, Easton and Zmijewski 1989), so I 
include LNMVE, BOOKMKT and RETVOL as control variables.      
3.7  Results on the market reaction to earnings news in the presence of discrimination 
Main Results 
Table 14 provides descriptive statistics on the firm-quarter observations that 
comprise the sample.  Panel A shows that approximately 55% of the sample conference 
calls are discriminating.  Panel B provides further insights of discrimination by the sign of 
earnings news.  Of the 8,836 good earnings news observations, 4,685 (56%) are 
accompanied by discriminating conference calls.  Similarly, 52% (2,062 of 3,948) of bad 
earnings news are accompanied by discriminating conference calls.  Within each partition 
of earnings news in Panel B, firms holding discriminating (non-discriminating) calls are 
larger (smaller) and have lower (higher) book-to-market and prior return volatilities.  
However, the differences in each of these characteristics across any 
discrimination/earnings news combination are not economically significant. 
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The multiple regression results are presented in Table 15.  The first column of 
coefficients provides Newey-West robust pooled estimates of the effects of discrimination 
on the interpretation of earnings news.  Consistent with prior research, and as expected, the 
coefficients on the eight partitions of earnings (coefficients β1 through β8 are positive and 
statistically significant).  Additionally, consistent with Freeman and Tse (1992) large 
magnitude surprises (β1, β2, β5, β6) have lower ERCs than small magnitude surprises (β3, 
β4, β7, β8).   
Turning to the comparisons of interest with respect to discrimination, results show 
a statistically larger positive earnings response for discrimination in the case of large good 
news earnings (β1=1.613 < β2=2.765, p = 0.01).  In terms of economic significance, a firm 
with large magnitude good news that discriminates receives an earnings multiple more 
than double that of a firm that does not discriminate.  Firms that discriminate with small 
good news earnings receive an earnings multiple of 9.388, compared with non-
discriminating firms who receive a multiple of 8.960.  However, this difference is not 
statistically significant (p= 0.65).   
Tests examining of the set of bad news earnings surprises fail to strongly reject the 
null hypothesis of no discrimination effects for both large and small magnitude earnings 
surprises.  In particular, the ERCs do not statistically differ based on discrimination for 
large magnitude bad news firms (β5 vs. β6, p=0.23).  For small magnitude bad news firms, 
the coefficient difference between β7 and β8 is marginally significant with a p value of 
0.10.  Together these results imply that, compared to the good news earnings situation 
where discrimination had some positive pricing effects, managers discriminating in the 
 63 
presence of any magnitude bad news receive no softening of the negative market reaction 
to the earnings news.   
The asymmetric effects of discrimination corroborates the earlier results suggesting 
that, in the presence of an earnings disappointment, the favorable analysts become as 
scrutinizing as the unfavorable analysts.  If both favorable and unfavorable analysts 
become equally scrutinizing in the presence of bad news, discrimination should no longer 
represent a meaningful choice variable for a manager wishing to control the scrutiny level 
he faces.  Additionally, the incremental positive market reaction to some good news 
surprises is consistent with both the possibility that the manager is overselling good news 
implications to the market and the possibility that the manager is using discrimination to 
better elaborate on the positive aspects of the firm.  These competing hypotheses are 
investigated below, after robustness tests are performed to assess the stability of the results 
presented thus far. 
Robustness Checks 
 The second column of coefficients in Table 15 uses the Fama MacBeth (1973) 
procedure to estimate model (5).  Results using this approach show that the average 
coefficient for discriminating large magnitude good news earnings (3.140) is larger than 
non-discriminating large magnitude good news earnings (2.150).  The difference between 
coefficients is 0.990, which is similar to the 1.152 difference obtained in the pooled results.  
Unlike the pooled results, however, this coefficient difference of 0.990 is only statistically 
significant in a one tailed test at marginally the 10% level (p=0.19 in a two tailed test, 
0.095 in a one tailed test).  Thus, results are weakly consistent with the pooled estimation 
with respect to large magnitude good news earnings.   
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This weak result may be due to low power within each of the 12 quarterly 
regressions.  In the pooled sample, large magnitude good news observations represents 977 
of the total sample observations of 13,188 (or approximately 8%).  Averaging 977 
observations across 12 regressions yields approximately 81 quarterly observations that 
must be split between discriminating and non-discriminating.   
Results using the Fama MacBeth procedure remain consistent for small magnitude 
good news earnings and large magnitude bad news earnings.  As in the pooled results, 
there appears to be no difference in the discriminating and non-discriminating cases.  
However, results under Fama MacBeth show that discriminating small magnitude bad 
news firms have lower average ERC multiples (difference = -2.669, FM t-statistic = -2.44, 
p=0.03).  In particular, such firms that discriminate have an average ERC 7.161, compared 
with a multiple of 9.830 for firms that do not discriminate.  These magnitudes were similar 
to the 7.595 and 9.719 provided in the pooled results, however their difference there was 
marginally significant at the 10% level.  Thus, at least using this specification, it appears 
that discriminating helps soften the negative market reaction the firm has to small negative 
earnings news. 
Table 16 assesses the sensitivity of the pooled results for changes in the 
measurement of the dependent variable.  The first (second) column measures abnormal 
market returns by subtracting the equal weighted CRSP return (size decile return) from the 
firm’s raw return.  The coefficients in each regression are similar in magnitude to those 
reported in Table 15.  Discrimination increases the positive market reaction to large good 
news earnings when the dependent variable is measured using equally weighted CRSP 
CARs (β1 < β2, p = 0.02) or size adjusted CARs (β1 < β2, p = 0.02).  The coefficient 
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differences for small magnitude good news and large magnitude bad news in 
discriminating and non-discriminating cases are not statistically significant as in Table 15.  
Additionally, using the equal weighted CRSP returns adjustment (size decile returns 
adjustment) provide no statistical support for a discrimination effect in the small 
magnitude bad news earnings setting (p=0.16 and 0.16, respectively).  This results counters 
the marginal (strong) statistical significance found in this partition in Table 15 under the 
pooled (Fama MacBeth) approach. 
3.8  Implications 
As a whole, the evidence thus far is most consistent with managerial discrimination 
having positive pricing effects for large magnitude good news earnings.  This result is 
consistent with both the regulator scenario and the manager scenario.  Regulators are 
concerned with the positive pricing effects being evidence of unsophisticated investors 
being fooled into over-reacting.  Managers would argue that they are simply removing 
asymmetry that is otherwise attached to their good news claims.  I attempt to distinguish 
between these competing views by first reassessing the incremental pricing results in the 
relative presence and absence of sophisticated investors, and then by investigating 
subsequent stock returns.   
Investor Sophistication 
The first set of tests relies on the underpinnings of the regulator argument for 
discrimination yielding overreaction to positive earnings news.  Recall that SEC and 
regulator interest in the potential detrimental effects of discrimination is the protection of 
the unsophisticated investor.  For discrimination to mislead investors, it must be the case 
that the marginal investor is not aware of the incentive alignment between managers and 
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favorable analysts.  If the results documented thus far are consistent with the regulator 
scenario, then the positive incremental market response to good news in the presence of 
discrimination should be more pronounced when the marginal investor is relatively 
unsophisticated. 
To consider this case, I re-estimate model (5) while allowing all coefficients to vary 
with whether the marginal investor is of high or low sophistication:  
CARi,j,t  =  HighSoph x (β0 + β1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + β3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t                                            
                                            + β4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t + β5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t   
                                            +β7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +β8 BNDCSmall_UEi,j,t   + β9 LNMVEi,j,t  
                                            + β10 BOOKMKTi,j,t + β11 RETVOLi,j,t) +                                                          (6) 
                  LowSoph x (α0 + α1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + α2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + α3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t                                            
                                            + α4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t + α5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + α6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t   
                                            +α7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +α8 BNDCSmall_UEi,j,t   + α9 LNMVEi,j,t  
                                            + α10 BOOKMKTi,j,t + α11 RETVOLi,j,t) + υi,j,t                                              
where all variables are as previously defined.  I use institutional holdings and 
analyst following as two variables to proxy for the sophistication of the marginal investor 
(Schrand and Walther 2000).  I measure institutional holdings as the percentage of 
outstanding shares held at the most recent calendar quarter prior to the fiscal quarter end.  
Analyst following is simply the number of analysts supplying a quarterly earnings forecast 
to the I/B/E/S consensus forecast immediately preceding the earnings announcement date.   
I begin by ranking the full sample of observations in thirds based institutional 
holdings.  I then code investor sophistication as high (HighSoph = 1) or low (LowSoph = 
1) if the firm quarter observation falls in the top (bottom) third.  The middle third is 
eliminated to remove noise from the sophistication partition.  The results of estimating 
equation (6) using the institutional holding proxy are presented in the first two columns of 
Table 17.  As shown in the first column, the coefficient difference for large good news in 
the discriminating versus non discriminating case is 1.370 (α1=1.542 < α2=2.912, p = 0.01) 
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for the low sophistication condition, and 2.236 (β1=1.064 < β2=3.300, p = 0.01) for the 
high sophistication condition.  Unreported analysis shows that the low sophistication 
difference of 1.370 is not statistically different than the high sophistication difference of 
2.236 (p=0.42).  Theses results imply that the discrimination effect in the large magnitude 
good news partition does not vary with investor sophistication.   
When I repeat the same analysis using analyst following as the proxy for investor 
sophistication, I obtain similar results.  Again, both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors react incrementally positively to large magnitude good news earnings (β1< β2 and 
α1< α2).  Further the difference in the incremental market reaction is not statistically 
different between sophisticated and usophisticated investors (p=0.34).  The results under 
both proxies for sophistication are inconsistent with SEC concerns that the incremental 
positive reaction to large good news earnings is may be evidence of an unsophisticated 
investor being taken advantage of by management.   
Subsequent Market Returns 
Another method to distinguish between the regulator and manager scenarios is to 
examine ex post stock returns.  Under the regulator scenario of overreaction, as time 
passes, investors should realize the true state of the firm and unwind the good news claims 
of managers.  Thus, a portfolio of good news earnings surprises where managers 
discriminate should exhibit negative ex post returns as the true state is revealed, while the 
portfolio of good news earnings surprise where managers did not discriminate should 
exhibit no reversal in ex post returns. 
On the other hand, discrimination may simply allow managers to better resolve 
uncertainty surrounding good news claims.  If so, as time passes, investors will resolve 
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uncertainty surrounding good news claims for the non discriminating conference calls.  
Combined, this implies that, all else equal, a portfolio of good news earnings surprises in 
the presence of discrimination should exhibit less positive price drift compared with  a 
portfolio of good news earnings surprises in the absence of discrimination.   
Interestingly, the fact that the positive incremental price reaction resulting from 
discrimination is concentrated in the large good news earnings partition makes it more 
likely that the manager scenario holds as opposed to the regulator scenario.  Doyle et al. 
(2005) document severe under reaction to large good news earnings surprises over a three 
year horizon, which implies that an incremental reaction to large good news earnings must 
be extremely large in order to be evidence of over-reaction. 
To investigate these competing hypotheses, Table 18 provides and plots cumulative 
abnormal stock returns (CARs) for two portfolios of good news earnings surprise firms:  
those that hold discriminating conference calls and those that do not.  CARs are 
accumulated beginning the second day after the earnings announcement through various 10 
day increment horizons, ending 90 days from the earnings announcement.  The 
accumulation period examined ends 90 days after the earnings conference call to avoid 
cumulating returns associated with the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement for the 
same firm.  While this short window limits the time in which potential reversals could 
occur, it does lend more credence to statistical inferences, which tend to deteriorate as the 
time horizon widens (Kothari and Warner 1997).   
The plotted CARs in Table 18 show that returns to good news surprises 
accompanied by non-discriminating conference calls are more positive than discriminating 
conference calls at all time horizons presented.  The difference widens as time passes, and 
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at 90 days past the earnings announcement, CARs for non-discriminating conference calls 
are 3.3%, compared with 1.8% for discriminating conference calls.  While this difference 
is statistically significant at conventional levels, the economic significance is not 
overpowering.  Nonetheless, the results do help disentangle the competing hypotheses 
presented previously.  Consistent with the manager scenario, good news discriminating 
(non-discriminating) firms exhibit less (more) drift, suggesting that discrimination may 
simply allow the manager to better resolve uncertainty of good news claims.  There 
appears to be no evidence of return reversal in the window explored, as the regulator 
scenario predicts.    
Unreported analysis regressing the 90 day window CARs on an indicator for 
whether the good news earnings conference call was discriminating and standard risk 
proxies (size, market to book and stock price volatility) is consistent with the inferences 
drawn from Table 18.  As such, risk differences between discriminating and non-
discriminating good news earnings conference calls do not explain the differential return 
patterns. 
3.9  Conclusion 
I provide initial evidence on one potential consequence of managerial 
discrimination:  the interpretation of earnings news.  I find that when managers 
discriminate, the market reacts more strongly to large magnitude good news 
announcements.  I also show that discrimination has no differential effects on small 
magnitude good news nor on the interpretation of bad news.  Collectively, discrimination 
appears to have an asymmetric impact on the interpretation of earnings news. 
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I also provide empirical evidence regarding how discrimination could effect the 
interpretation of earnings news.  By discriminating, managers manipulate the scrutiny they 
will face from the analysts they interact with during the conference call.  I show that the 
scrutiny of analyst questions is negatively associated with the favorableness of the 
analyst’s view of the firm, but only among firms who meet or beat earnings targets.  The 
asymmetric scrutiny relatively favorable analysts place on firms is consistent with the 
asymmetric market reactions I document and provides the first direct empirical support for 
the notion that analyst scrutiny varies depending on the sign of the earning surprise 
(Graham et al. 2005). 
From a regulatory standpoint, the incremental market reaction to good earnings 
news is consistent with market participants potentially believing reported large magnitude 
good news earnings are better than they really are.  However, further investigation reveals 
that this incremental reaction to good news earnings in the discrimination setting is not 
concentrated in the subsample of firms where investors are relatively unsophisticated.  On 
the contrary, the discriminatory effects persist to an equivalent extent for both 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors  Additionally, investigation of returns 
subsequent to the conference call suggests that discrimination does not predict a reversal in 
stock returns, as regulator concerns suggest.  Rather, firms with good news earnings that 
discriminate exhibit less price drift that firms that do not discriminate.  As a whole, the 
positive incremental reaction to good news results is inconsistent with regulator concerns 
that unsophisticated investors are being fooled, and more consistent with managers 
resolving asymmetry about good news prospects.   
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The conclusions of this chapter are subject to a number of limitations.  First, I only 
investigate the effects of discrimination on the interpretation of earnings.  Regardless of the 
scrutiny a manager chooses to face via discrimination, other market mechanisms may limit 
the ability to place a firm in a favorable light in the conference call setting.  For instance, a 
manager can face litigation for overly inflating the firm’s prospects or withholding material 
negative news.  Discrimination may therefore have more powerful effects in other settings 
such as analyst’s choice in selecting firms to cover or with respect to covering analyst’s 
career concerns.   
Second, I use stock price changes to assess the impact of discrimination.  Because 
stock prices aggregate beliefs about the firm’s prospects, a more powerful assessment of 
the discrimination effects would be to investigate trading behavior of market participants.  
Indeed, if discrimination results in one group of investors systematically interpreting 
earnings news as positive and the other negative, the aggregate trade would not impact 
price but would impact volume.   
Finally, it is difficult to conclude that discrimination causes a differential market 
reaction.  A correlated but omitted factor could drive both a manager’s discrimination 
choice and the market reaction to earnings, although such a factor is not obvious.  The 
results presented here are merely associations and should be interpreted as such. 
Despite these limitations, I provide initial evidence suggesting discrimination plays 
a role in the interpretation of earnings news.  What impact discrimination may have on 
other market participants, or what other strategic disclosure choices might be associated 




Panel A: Distribution of firm-quarters and analyst-firm-quarters by calendar quarter 
Calendar Quarter of 






2002-Q1 556 3 3,211 2 
2002-Q2 1,133 6 8,570 6 
2002-Q3 1,282 7 9,269 6 
2002-Q4 1,646 8 14,270 10 
2003-Q1 1,323 7 7,264 5 
2003-Q2 1,750 9 12,712 9 
2003-Q3 1,885 10 13,463 9 
2003-Q4 2,046 10 17,157 12 
2004-Q1 1,692 9 9,160 6 
2004-Q2 2,072 11 16,042 11 
2004-Q3 2,075 11 16,135 11 
2004-Q4 2,217 11 19,455 13 
Total 19,677 100% 146,708 100% 
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Table 1 (continued)   
     







Chemicals                460 2                  2,852  2 
Computers             3,678 19                32,238  22 
Extractive                844 4                  8,668  6 
Financial             2,127 11                18,067  12 
Food                369 2                  2,531  2 
Insurance/RealEstate                356 2                  1,176  1 
Manf:ElectricalEqpt                791 4                  5,426  4 
Manf:Instruments             1,181 6                  7,362  5 
Manf:Machinery                667 3                  4,845  3 
Manf:Metal                361 2                  1,954  1 
Manf:Misc.                128 1                    801  1 
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc                233 1                  1,027  1 
Manf:TransportEqpt                381 2                  2,748  2 
Mining/Construction                418 2                  2,499  2 
Pharmaceuticals                  83 0                    506  0 
Retail:Misc.             1,103 6                  7,847  5 
Retail:Restaurant             1,231 6                10,251  7 
Retail:Wholesale                277 1                  2,497  2 
Services                470 2                  2,556  2 
Textiles/Print/Publish             1,852 9                12,916  9 
Transportation                847 4                  5,165  4 
Utilities             1,155 6                  9,253  6 
Not Assigned                665 3                  3,523  2 
Total 19,677 100% 146,708 100% 
     
Panel C: Distribution of firm-quarters by stock exchange  




   
10,767 54 
NASDAQ                       8,608  44 
AMEX  142  1 
Non AMEX, NYSE, NASDAQ                     160 1 
Total   19,677 100% 
     
a Industry definitions are obtained from Barth et al. (2005). 
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TABLE 2 
Firm level descriptive statistics for 19,677 Conference Call Transcripts 
Variablea N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev 
Firm and CEO Characteristics 
Assets – Total ($MM) 19,677 11,409.192 377.295 1,212.513 4,489.444 59,411.654 
Market Value of Equity ($MM) 19,482 6,077.712 473.318 1,187.188 3,663.366 20,884.771 
Market to Book Ratio 19,476 3.585 1.474 2.183 3.444 73.350 
Return on Assets 19,668 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.020 0.060 
CEO option wealth sensitivity 
($MM) 11,252 0.519 0.070 0.182 0.462 1.604 
InstHold 19,677 0.588 0.413 0.657 0.818 0.296 
Conference Call Characteristics 
CorpCount 19,677 3.411 3.000 3.000 4.000 1.389 
NonCorpCount 19,677 8.799 6.000 9.000 11.000 4.284 
NumAnalyst 19,677 7.456 3.000 6.000 10.000 5.840 
IBESonCall 19,677 3.859 2.000 3.000 6.000 3.025 
IBESonCallDum 19,677 0.881 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.324 
Length of Conference Call (min) 19,677 52.381 40.753 52.387 62.893 17.239 
Length of Q&A (min) 19,677 29.475 19.687 29.760 39.160 15.310 
Open 19,677 0.551 0.472 0.587 0.682 0.204 
MarketRec 19,677 2.419 2.067 2.400 2.750 0.499 
OnCallRec 17,334 2.324 2.000 2.333 2.800 0.654 
MarketEst 19,677 0.273 0.060 0.230 0.440 0.404 
OnCallEst 17,334 0.276 0.060 0.230 0.450 0.417 
Actual 19,672 0.273 0.050 0.230 0.460 0.470 
MarketFE 19,672 0.000 -0.020 0.010 0.030 0.198 
OnCallFE 17,331 0.008 -0.010 0.010 0.030 0.191 
               
 a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3   
Descriptive and univariate analysis of analyst conference call participation 
Panel A: 
 Full Sample OnCall = 0 (N=90,846)  OnCall = 1 (N=55,862)  Mean  Median  
Variablea Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median  Difference  Difference  
Analyst View of the firm  
OnCall 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000  1.000 1.000  N/A  N/A  
Sbuy 0.199 0.000 0.181 0.000  0.227 0.000  -0.046 *** N/A  
Buy 0.264 0.000 0.248 0.000  0.290 0.000  -0.042 *** N/A  
Hold 0.450 0.000 0.475 0.000  0.408 0.000  0.067 *** N/A  
Sell 0.068 0.000 0.074 0.000  0.059 0.000  0.015 *** N/A  
Ssell 0.019 0.000 0.022 0.000  0.016 0.000  0.006 *** N/A  
Time and Competition Constraints  
Open 0.561 0.597 0.531 0.575  0.610 0.625  -0.079 *** -0.051 *** 
NumAnalyst 12.029 11.000 12.568 11.000  11.153 10.000  1.414 *** 1.000 *** 
Analyst Characteristics  
AllStar 0.177 0.000 0.151 0.000  0.220 0.000  -0.069 *** N/A  
PriorAcc 0.697 0.800 0.688 0.800  0.711 0.819  -0.023 *** -0.019 *** 
FirmExp_Raw 3.374 2.282 3.270 2.236  3.544 2.416  -0.274 *** -0.181 *** 
FirmExp 0.462 0.377 0.450 0.357  0.480 0.409  -0.030 *** -0.052 *** 
GenExp_Raw 7.479 5.847 7.429 5.808  7.562 5.907  -0.133 *** -0.099 *** 
GenExp 0.386 0.295 0.383 0.291  0.391 0.301  -0.008 *** -0.010 *** 
Inds_Raw 3.297 3.000 3.252 3.000  3.370 3.000  -0.118 *** 0.000 *** 
Inds 0.389 0.333 0.389 0.333  0.389 0.333  0.000  0.000  
ForFreq_Raw 15.483 13.000 15.282 12.000  15.811 13.000  -0.529 *** -1.000 *** 
ForFreq 0.423 0.360 0.410 0.343  0.444 0.389  -0.034 *** -0.046 *** 
BrokerSize_Raw 91.916 60.000 88.207 59.000  97.948 67.000  -9.741 *** -8.000 *** 
BrokerSize 0.338 0.237 0.326 0.215  0.358 0.274  -0.032 *** -0.059 *** 
Companies_Raw 15.817 15.000 15.953 15.000  15.598 15.000  0.355 *** 0.000 *** 
Companies 0.472 0.440 0.469 0.435  0.477 0.450  -0.008 *** -0.015 *** 
OnCallPrior 0.584 1.000 0.446 0.000  0.807 1.000  -0.361 *** N/A  
RecHorizon 297.942 247.000 312.873 269.000  273.662 212.000  39.211 *** 57.000 *** 
Queue|OnCall N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.501 0.500  N/A  N/A  
Time|OnCall N/A N/A N/A N/A  2.606 2.253  N/A  N/A  
 
 76 
Table 3 (continued) 


























OnCall  N/A N/A -0.082 0.190 0.035 0.087 -0.093 0.013 0.013 0.042 0.050 0.000 0.049 0.355 -0.080 
Que| 
OnCall N/A  0.118 -0.057 0.072 0.004 0.108 -0.045 0.064 0.021 0.059 0.006 0.015 0.128 0.067 0.005 
Time| 
OnCall N/A 0.130  -0.032 0.125 -0.035 0.007 -0.202 0.034 0.044 0.070 0.046 0.033 0.062 0.063 0.025 
IBESRec -0.085 -0.061 -0.027  -0.006 0.007 0.088 0.015 0.023 -0.004 -0.021 -0.018 -0.022 0.129 -0.012 -0.103 
Open 0.170 0.073 0.093 -0.020  0.008 -0.002 0.030 0.008 -0.016 -0.019 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013 0.111 -0.011 
PriorAcc 0.041 0.005 -0.013 0.003 0.010  0.028 0.129 -0.005 -0.037 -0.030 0.018 -0.010 -0.018 -0.002 -0.083 
AllStar 0.087 0.109 0.025 0.087 0.004 0.019  0.023 0.135 0.165 0.128 -0.038 0.025 0.341 0.081 -0.024 
Num 
Analyst -0.087 -0.044 -0.197 0.016 0.053 0.055 0.042  -0.060 -0.122 -0.128 -0.072 -0.120 -0.142 -0.051 0.012 
Companies 0.015 0.065 0.034 0.021 0.011 0.006 0.136 -0.045  0.333 0.219 0.086 0.423 0.128 0.039 0.040 
GenExp 0.014 0.026 0.035 -0.004 -0.011 -0.022 0.184 -0.072 0.365  0.469 0.043 0.189 0.109 0.036 0.087 
FirmExp 0.041 0.061 0.068 -0.021 -0.020 -0.017 0.130 -0.113 0.229 0.493  0.128 0.122 0.095 0.094 0.120 
ForFreq 0.050 0.004 0.036 -0.016 0.001 0.031 -0.029 -0.035 0.092 0.051 0.148  0.028 -0.051 0.092 0.004 
Inds 0.003 0.018 0.025 -0.024 0.001 0.006 0.035 -0.093 0.419 0.195 0.125 0.029  -0.017 0.008 0.025 
Broker 
Size 0.057 0.137 0.061 0.149 -0.008 -0.001 0.369 -0.068 0.144 0.114 0.092 -0.031 -0.033  0.065 -0.013 
OnCall 
Prior 0.355 0.065 0.075 -0.014 0.093 0.003 0.081 -0.042 0.042 0.049 0.103 0.097 0.012 0.080  0.037 
Rec 
Horizon -0.092 0.003 0.027 -0.084 -0.017 -0.087 -0.030 0.011 0.029 0.069 0.100 0.013 0.019 0.003 0.050  
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level for t-test of means and  wilcoxon test of medians for continuous variables, and chi-square test of equal proportions for 
indicator variables.  
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 




Logistic regression investigating the association between conference call participation and the 
favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm 
 
Panel A:  Model Estimation 
     OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 Sbuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 Sselli,j,tt  
             + β5 Openi,j,t  + β6  NumAnalysti,j,t + β7  AllStari,j,t                                                
+ β8  PriorAcci,j,t + β9  FirmExpi,j,t + β10  GenExpi,j,t + β11  Indsi,j,t      
+ β12  ForFreqi,j,t + β13  BrokerSizei,j,t + β14  Companiesi,j,t                       
+ β15  PriorOnCalli,j,t + β16  RecHorizoni,j,t + υI,j,t 
(1)
 Variable a Predicted Sign     Coefficients
 Odds Ratio χ2 statisticc 
 Intercept ? -2.569 ***          2,464.80  
Analyst view of the firm      
 Sbuy + and > β2  0.500 *** 1.649            564.91  
 Buy + 0.356 *** 1.428            346.87  
 Sell - -0.174 *** 0.840              27.03  
 Ssell - and < β4  -0.274 *** 0.760              23.54  
Time and Competition Constraints      
 Open + 2.131 *** 8.425         1,071.39  
 NumAnalyst - -0.031 *** 0.970            394.99  
Analyst quality      
 AllStar + 0.423 *** 1.527            306.48  
 PriorAcc + 0.279 *** 1.321            157.18  
 FirmExp + 0.071 *** 1.074                6.19  
 GenExp + -0.088 *** 0.916                9.01  
 Inds - -0.073 *** 0.929                8.04  
 ForFreq + 0.115 *** 1.122              24.42  
 BrokerSize + 0.069 *** 1.071                6.20  
 Companies - -0.045 * 0.956                2.41  
 OnCallPrior + 1.628 *** 5.093         7,580.25  
 RecHorizon - -0.001 *** 0.999            692.17  
      
 Sample Size b  146,708    
 Pseudo R2  14.9%    
 Percent correctly predicted 70.0%    
      
 Tests χ2 statisticc Prob(χ2)    
 Wald goodness-of-fitd 10,332 <.001    
 β1 = β 2  42.25 <.001    
 β3 = β 4  2.42 0.060    





Panel B:  Marginal Probability Effect Plots e 
  
Marginal Probability Effects of Stock Recommendations on the Predicted 
























Type 2 Analyst Type 1 Analyst  
***, **, * Significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test (one-tailed when predicted). 
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
b The sample includes 146,708 analyst-firm-quarter observations. 
c Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-White(1980) procedure, with firm level 
clustering (Rogers 1993) for lack of independence of analyst observations by firm. 
d Wald goodness of fit test is utilized in place of a likelihood ratio test because of clustered maximum 
likelihood estimates. 
e Predicted probabilities are calculated as )1/( )ˆ()ˆ( Bxx ee ′′ +β , where β̂  is the vector of fitted values from 
equation (1) reported in Panel A and x′ is the vector of values equal to the sample mean (see Table 2, 
Panel B) for all continuous variables, and 1 for PriorOnCall.  Remaining values for stock recommendations 





Logistic regression investigating the association between conference call participation and the 
relative favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm 
 
Panel A:  Model Estimation 
     OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 RelRec  
             + β2 Openi,j,t  + β3  NumAnalysti,j,t + β4  AllStari,j,t                                                
+ β5  PriorAcci,j,t + β6  FirmExpi,j,t + β7  GenExpi,j,t + β8  Indsi,j,t          
+ β9  ForFreqi,j,t + β10  BrokerSizei,j,t + β11  Companiesi,j,t                         
+ β12  PriorOnCalli,j,t + β13  RecHorizoni,j,t + υI,j,t 
 Variable a Predicted Sign     Coefficients
 Odds Ratio χ2 statisticc 
 Intercept ? -2.624 ***          2,464.80  
Analyst view of the firm      
 RelRec +  0.460 *** 1.585            830.39  
Time and Competition Constraints      
 Open + 2.125 *** 8.376         3869.34  
 NumAnalyst - -0.031 *** 0.969          1228.26  
Analyst quality      
 AllStar + 0.426 *** 1.531            644.15  
 PriorAcc + 0.285 *** 1.321            215.91  
 FirmExp + 0.089 *** 1.093              19.61   
 GenExp + -0.093 *** 0.911              17.38  
 Inds - -0.077 *** 0.926              15.46  
 ForFreq + 0.128 *** 1.137              46.22  
 BrokerSize + 0.064 *** 1.066                9.58  
 Companies - -0.040 * 0.960                3.05  
 OnCallPrior + 1.621 *** 5.055         8,953.70  
 RecHorizon - -0.001 *** 0.999            981.88  
      
 Sample Size b  141,480    
 Pseudo R2  14.6%    
 Percent correctly predicted 75.0%    
      
 Tests χ2 statisticc Prob(χ2)    
 Wald goodness-of-fitd 11,421 <.001    
       
***, **, * Significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test (one-tailed when predicted). 
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
b The initial sample includes 146,708 analyst-firm-quarter observations and 141,480 used in estimation.  
The loss of observations relative to the initial sample results from observations where there was no 
dispersion in the analyst forecasts, which results in a zero denominator in the RelRec measure.   
c Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-White(1980) procedure, with firm level 
clustering (Rogers 1993) for lack of independence of analyst observations by firm. 
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TABLE 6 
Logistic regression investigating the association between the probability of conference call 




















where s = the OnCalli,j,t-1=1 or the OnCalli,j,t-1=0 sample 
(1a)
 Sample: 
OnCalli,j,t-1 = 1 
Sample:  
OnCalli,j,t-1 = 0 
Recommendaiton 
Level Changeb Variable 
a Predicted Sign     Coefficients
 χ2 
statisticc      Coefficients 
χ2 
statisticc 
 Intercept ? -0.813 *** 57.64  -1.400 *** 173.75 
Upgrades         
1 Ssell to Sell + N/Ae  N/Ae  -0.408  0.60 
1 Sell to Hold + -0.181  1.80  -0.117  0.99 
1 Hold to Buy + 0.233 *** 5.93  0.134 * 2.50 
1 Buy to Sbuy + 0.243 ** 3.22  0.116  0.87 
2 Ssell to Hold + -0.137  0.51  -0.562 *** 10.75 
2 Sell to Buy + -0.277  0.85  0.098  0.12 
2 Hold to Sbuy + 0.218 ** 4.59  -0.021  0.05 
3 Ssell to Buy + 0.041  0.00  N/Af  N/Af 
3 Sell to Sbuy + 0.169  0.05  -0.564  0.52 
4 Ssell to Sbuy + N/Ae  N/Ae  N/Ae  N/Ae 
Downgrades         
1 Sbuy to Buy - 0.232 ** 4.13  0.174 * 2.86 
1 Buy to Hold - -0.012  0.02  -0.168 ** 5.06 
1 Hold to Sell - -0.243 ** 4.31  -0.315 *** 9.53 
1 Sell to Ssell - 0.113  0.07  -0.393  1.02 
2 Sbuy to Hold - -0.060  0.41  -0.079  0.84 
2 Buy to Sell - -0.236  0.85  -0.669 *** 7.03 
2 Hold to Ssell - -0.152  0.71  -0.028  0.03 
3 Sbuy to Sell - N/Ae  N/Ae  -0.973 * 2.18 
3 Buy to Ssell - -1.380  0.89  0.460  0.36 
4 Sbuy to Ssell - 0.635  0.89  0.891  2.66 
Control Variables         
 NumAnalyst - -0.013 *** 11.75  -0.033 *** 95.41 
 Open + 2.702 *** 311.29  1.921 *** 161.02 
          
 Sample Size d  7,501    9,034   
 Pseudo R2  5.0%    3.7%   
 Percent correctly predicted 68.9%    68.5%   
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where s = the OnCalli,j,t-1=1 or the OnCalli,j,t-1=0 sample 
(1a)








Sample: OnCalli,j,t-1 = 1      60.9% 4.6% 
 Intercept ? -0.769 *** 74.72     
 RecChange + 0.055 *** 7.64     
 NumAnalyst - -0.013 *** 13.07     
 Open + 2.695 *** 400.95     
          
Sample: OnCalli,j,t-1 = 0      62.3% 3.7% 
 Intercept ? -1.452 *** 277.17     
 RecChange + 0.024 * 1.58     
 NumAnalyst - -0.033 *** 103.89     
 Open + 1.914 *** 226.25     
          
         
      
 
Notes to Table 6: 
*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (one tailed for signed predictions). 
A Upgrades and downgrades are indicator variables for recommendation changes occurring during between 
consecutive quarterly earnings conference call.  See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
b Recommendation level changes represents the magnitude of the upgrade or downgrade as the number of 
recommendation levels between the prior and current recommendation change. 
c Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-White(1980) procedure, with firm level 
clustering (Rogers 1993) for lack of independence of analyst observations by firm. 
d The sample consists of the subset of all analyst-firm-quarter observations where analyst participation was 
measurable on both the current and prior quarter earnings conference call, and where the analyst made a 
recommendation change or reiteration between the two conference calls.  The OnCalli,j,t-1=0 sample 
examines changes in participation probabilities for those analysts who did not previously participate on the 
conference call. The OnCalli,j,t-1=1 sample examines changes in participation probabilities for those 
analysts who did previously participate on the conference call. 
e Represents 17 upgrade and downgrade observations that were not included in the model because the 
upgrade or downgrade combination predicted participation perfectly.   




Fama MacBeth logistic regression investigating the association between conference call participation 
and the favorableness of the analyst’s view of the firm 
 
OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 Sbuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 Sselli,j,t  
             + β5 Openi,j,t  + β6  NumAnalysti,j,t + β7  AllStari,j,t     + β8  PriorAcci,j,t                   
+ β9  FirmExpi,j,t + β10  GenExpi,j,t + β11  Indsi,j,t      + β12  ForFreqi,j,t + β13  BrokerSizei,j,t + β14  









Unique randomly selected 
analyst-firm-quarter 
 Variable a Predicted Sign     Coefficients
 FM t-
statisticc      Coefficients FM t-statistic
c 
 Intercept ? -2.552 *** -13.412  -2.603 *** -14.762 
Analyst view of the firm         
 Sbuy + and >β2 0.468 *** 9.419  0.485 *** 14.346 
 Buy + 0.259 *** 6.262  0.347 *** 12.325 
 Sell - -0.152 * -1.364  -0.130 *** -3.694 
 Ssell - and < β4 -0.309 *** -3.852  -0.356 *** -3.663 
Time and Competition Constraints        
 Open + 2.057 *** 10.413  2.092 *** 11.148 
 NumAnalyst - -0.035 *** -9.339  -0.029 *** -11.403 
Analyst quality         
 AllStar + 0.417 *** 7.272  0.419 *** 24.932 
 PriorAcc + 0.284 *** 4.400  0.258 *** 6.276 
 FirmExp + 0.040  0.601  0.084 ** 2.607 
 GenExp + 0.041  0.672  -0.065  -1.778 
 Inds - -0.132 *** -3.190  -0.093 *** -4.510 
 ForFreq + 0.142 ** 1.999  0.092 * 1.466 
 BrokerSize + 0.054  0.711  0.041  0.851 
 Companies - 0.154 ** 3.085  -0.047 ** -1.958 
 OnCallPrior + 1.616 *** 12.883  1.580 *** 11.213 
 RecHorizon - -0.001 *** -11.501  -0.001 *** -10.133 
          
 Average Sample Size b  2,224    12,226 
 Pseudo R2    14.9%    13.4% 
       
      
***, **, * Significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test (one-tailed when predicted). 
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
b The average sample is the average number of observations used in quarterly estimation for the samples 
identified in Column A and Column B. 
c Fama MacBeth t-statistic equals the average of 12 quarterly logit coefficient divided by the standard error 
of these 12 quarterly logit coefficients.
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TABLE 8 
Effect of Managerial Incentives to Maintain High Stock Prices and Analyst Reliance on Management on Discrimination Extent 
Panel A:  Managerial Incentives measured via CEO Option Wealth Sensitivity to Stock Prices 
  
Regression Coefficients By Quintileb Median CEO Option Wealth Sensitivity 
($MM) by Quintilea Sbuy Buy Sell Ssell 
Q1 (Low Incentive):  0.03 0.450 0.363 -0.184 -0.275 
Q2:  0.13 0.481 0.315 -0.120 -0.260 
Q3:  0.28 0.506 0.324 0.018 -0.018 
Q4:  0.57 0.455 0.382 -0.161 -0.329 
Q5 (High Incentive):  1.69 0.431 0.366 -0.155 -0.698 





Difference P-Value  
SbuyQ5 – SbuyQ1 (+) -0.019 0.830  
SsellQ5 – SsellQ1 (-) -0.423 0.027 ** 









1 2 3 4 5
Incentive Quintile (1=Low 5=High)
Sbuy Buy Sell Ssell
      
      
Panel B:  Analyst Reliance on Management measured via Institutional Holdings 
     
Regression Coefficients By Rangeb 
Median InstHold By Quintilea Sbuy Buy Sell Ssell 
Q1 (Lowest Reliance): 0.40 0.388 0.355 -0.175 -0.240 
Q2:  0.60 0.429 0.342 -0.188 -0.314 
Q3:  0.71 0.503 0.373 -0.104 -0.226 
Q4:  0.82 0.565 0.344 -0.079 -0.092 
Q5 (Highest Reliance):  0.93 0.577 0.370 -0.183 -0.338 





Difference P-Value  
SbuyQ5 – SbuyQ1 (+)  0.189 0.003 *** 
SsellQ5 – SsellQ1 (-) -0.099 0.291  







1 2 3 4 5
Reliance Quintile (1=Low, 5=High)
Sbuy Buy Sell Ssell
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*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (one tailed for signed predictions).  Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-
White(1980) procedure, with firm level clustering (Rogers 1993)for lack of independence of analyst observations by firm.   
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions 
b Regression coefficients are obtained by running logistic regressions of equation (1) in Table 4 separately over samples pooled by incentive quintiles. 
 
















r  where q  is the incentive quintile of the manager or managerial reliance quintile of the analyst and x
r
 




Ordinary least squares regression investigating the association between the relative queue position of 
the analyst on the call and the analyst’s view of the firm  
 
Queue|OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 Sbuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 Sselli,j,t                     
+  β5 AllStari,j,t  + β6  PriorAcci,j,t + β7  FirmExpi,j,t                                        
+ β8  GenExpi,j,t + β9 Indsi,j,t + β10  ForFreqi,j,t + β11  BrokerSizei,j,t     
+ β12  Companiesi,j,t + β13  PriorOnCalli,j,t + υI,t 
(2)
 Variable a Predicted Sign     Coefficients
 t-statistics c  
 Intercept ? 0.373 *** 73.56  
Analyst view of the firm      
 Sbuy + and > β2  0.044 *** 13.81  
 Buy + 0.046 *** 15.62  
 Sell - -0.024 *** -4.43  
 Ssell - and < β3  -0.017 ** -1.78  
Analyst quality      
 AllStar + 0.049 *** 15.49  
 PriorAcc + 0.004  1.03  
 FirmExp + 0.033 *** 8.33  
 GenExp + -0.030 *** -6.80  
 Inds - -0.003  -0.78  
 ForFreq + 0.006 ** 1.67  
 BrokerSize + 0.094 *** 23.47  
 Companies - 0.039 *** 8.47  
 OnCallPrior + 0.043 *** 14.21  
      
 Sample Size b  55,489    
 Adjusted R2  3.7%    
       
 Tests F-statistic Prob(F)    
 β1 = β 2  0.23 0.633    
 β4 = β 5  0.30 0.583    
       
***, **, * Significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test (one-tailed when predicted). 
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
b The sample includes the subset of 146,708 analyst-firm-quarter observations who participated on the 
conference call. 





Ordinary least squares regression investigating the association between the time managers spend 
with the analyst on the conference call and the analyst's view of the firm  
 
Time|OnCalli,j,t  = β0 + β 1 SBuyi,j,t + β2 Buyi,j,t + β3Selli,j,t + β4 SSelli,j,t                      
+  β5 AllStari,j,t  + β6  PriorAcci,j,t + β7  FirmExpi,j,t                                        
+ β8  GenExpi,j,t + β9 Indsi,j,t + β10  ForFreqi,j,t + β11  BrokerSizei,j,t     
+ β12  Companiesi,j,t + β13  PriorOnCalli,j,t + υi,t 
(3)
 Variable a Predicted Sign     Coefficients
 t-statistics c  
 Intercept ? 2.006 *** 56.11  
Analyst view of the firm      
 Sbuy + and > β2  0.174 *** 7.52  
 Buy + 0.114 *** 5.66  
 Sell - -0.041  -1.20  
 Ssell - and < β3  0.135 * 1.87  
Analyst quality      
 AllStar + -0.093 *** -4.40  
 PriorAcc + -0.181 *** -6.70  
 FirmExp + 0.263 *** 9.22  
 GenExp + 0.055 * 1.65  
 Inds - 0.134 *** 4.71  
 ForFreq + 0.224 *** 6.75  
 BrokerSize + 0.422 *** 13.90  
 Companies - -0.009  -0.21  
 OnCallPrior + 0.276 *** 13.06  
      
 Sample Size b  52,060    
 Adjusted R2  1.7%    
       
 Tests F-statistic    
 β1 = β 2  5.73 ***    
 β4 = β 5  5.09 **    
       
***, **, * Significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test (one-tailed when predicted). 
a See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
b The sample includes the subset of 146,708 analyst-firm-quarter observations who participated on the 
conference call. 







Descriptive statistics for 125 randomly selected manager/analyst conference call dialogs 
          
  Variablea   Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev   
 Rec  3.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 1.420   
 SCRUTINIZING  4.576 3.000 4.000 6.000 2.262   
 OPENENDED  4.512 2.000 4.000 7.000 2.395   
 TOUGH  4.904 3.000 5.000 7.000 2.198   
 CHALLENGING  4.960 3.000 5.000 7.000 2.149   
 NEGNEWS  4.344 3.000 5.000 5.000 1.661   
 NETPOS_GI  0.029 0.019 0.029 0.039 0.017   
 Miss  0.288 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.455   
          
 a  See Appendix 2 for variable definitions       
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Table 12 
Correlation Table of Manager/Analyst Dialog Variables (N=125) 
 
 Rec  SCRUTINIZING OPENENDED TOUGH  CHALLENGING NEGNEWS NETPOS_GI Miss  
Rec   -0.226 ** 0.119  -0.158 * -0.151 * -0.106  0.179 ** -0.162 * 
   0.011  0.188  0.079  0.094  0.239  0.046  0.070  
                 
SCRUTINIZING -0.217 **   -0.493 *** 0.754 *** 0.776 *** 0.548 *** -0.284 *** 0.159 * 
 0.015    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.077  
                 
OPENENDED 0.127  -0.466 ***   -0.567 *** -0.557 *** -0.367 *** 0.080  -0.099  
 0.158  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.377  0.270  
                 
TOUGH -0.161 * 0.740 *** -0.553 ***   0.892 *** 0.508 *** -0.119  0.084  
 0.073  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.184  0.349  
                 
CHALLENGING -0.153 * 0.773 *** -0.550 *** 0.891 ***   0.557 *** -0.224 ** 0.152 * 
 0.089  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.012  0.090  
                 
NEGNEWS -0.094  0.545 *** -0.350 *** 0.496 *** 0.545 ***   -0.129  0.145  
 0.296  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.151  0.106  
                 
NETPOS_GI 0.236 *** -0.250 *** 0.078  -0.148 * -0.188 ** -0.131    -0.052  
 0.008  0.005  0.387  0.099  0.036  0.145    0.563  
                 
Miss -0.162 * 0.157 * -0.090  0.087  0.159 * 0.129  -0.013    
 0.070  0.080  0.318  0.334  0.077  0.151  0.888    
Notes:  ***, **, * indicates the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  P values are presented below 





Ordinary least squares regressions investigating the association between scrutiny proxies and 
the analyst's view of the firm, partitioned by whether the firm missed earnings targets (n=125).b 
iiiiii MisscMisscPROXYSCRUTINY υββββ +×+++= )(ReRe_ 3210     (4) 
 for i = 1 to 6 where i is one of six scrutiny proxies 
 




(β0)   
Rec 
 (β1)   
Miss 
(β2)  
Rec x Miss 
(β3)    
  
Test: 
β1 + β3 = 0  Adj R2 
                
SCRUTINIZING  5.672 *** -0.488 *** -0.532  0.446 *    0.03   10.16% 
Predicted Sign  ?  (-)    (+)        
(t-stat)  (10.91)  (-3.28)  (-0.59)  (1.54)        
                
OPENENDED  3.866 *** 0.238 * -0.154  -0.220     0.00   1.86% 
Predicted Sign  ?  (+)    (-)        
(t-stat)  (6.55)  (1.39)  (-0.15)  (-0.65)        
                
TOUGH  6.170 *** -0.487 *** -1.289  0.665 ***    0.57   10.20% 
Predicted Sign  ?  (-)    (+)        
(t-stat)  (12.51)  (-3.42)  (-1.49)  (2.41)        
                
CHALLENGING  6.239 *** -0.479 *** -0.901  0.581 **    0.21   14.60% 
Predicted Sign  ?  (-)    (+)        
(t-stat)  (13.02)  (-3.46)  (-1.11)  (2.22)        
                
NEGNEWS  4.863 *** -0.206 ** -0.495  0.340 *    0.43   3.13% 
Predicted Sign  ?  (-)    (+)        
(t-stat)  (13.08)  (-1.89)  (-0.71)  (1.47)        
                
NETPOS_GI  0.018 *** 0.003 *** 0.011 * -0.003 **    0.01   7.46% 
Predicted Sign  ?  (+)    (-)        
(t-stat)  (5.80)  (3.53)  (1.91)  (-1.81)        
                
                
***,**, *  significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test (one tailed when predicted) 
a  See Appendix 2 for variable definitions 
b  The analyses are based on an initial sample of 125 randomly drawn manager/analyst dialogs.  Removal of outliers was 
based on procedures outlined in Besley, et al. (1980) resulted in the following number of observations used in the estimation 
of each model: SCRUTINIZING (116), OPENENDED (121), TOUGH (113), CHALLENGING (110), NEGNEWS (116), 
NETPOS_GI (119). 
c  The 0.10 significance critical F-Value is 2.74.  In each regression the sum of β1 and β3  is not statistically different from 





Descriptive statistics for 13,188 firm-year observations 
           
Panel A:  Distribution of Pooled Sample Variables       
           
Variablea Mean   Q1 Median   Q3 Std Dev    
RECDIFF 0.085  -0.138 0.057  0.296 0.409    
NETPOS_GItran 0.032  0.027 0.032  0.037 0.008    
DISCRIMINATE 0.546  0.000 1.000  1.000 0.498    
CAR 0.002  -0.033 0.004  0.039 0.075    
UE 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.006    
BOOKMKT 0.500  0.273 0.438  0.638 0.562    
LNMVE 7.540  6.466 7.397  8.527 1.518    
RETVOL 0.026  0.016 0.023  0.032 0.013    
           





Good News Surprise 
(UE>0)  
Bad News Surprise 
(UE<0) 













RECDIFF  -0.251 0.374  -0.229 0.343  -0.245 0.367 
NETPOS_GItran  0.033 0.033  0.032 0.033  0.030 0.030 
CAR  -0.009 -0.016  0.014 0.016  -0.024 -0.021 
UE  0.000 0.000  0.003 0.002  -0.004 -0.004 
BOOKMKT  0.481 0.447  0.492 0.474  0.555 0.540 
LNMVE  6.976 7.226  7.576 7.719  7.261 7.506 
RETVOL  0.029 0.027  0.026 0.025  0.028 0.026 
          
N  398 456  3,701 4,685  1,886 2,062 
% of Sample  3.0% 3.5%  28.1% 35.5%  14.3% 15.6% 
          
                   





OLS regressions assessing the earnings response to good and bad news in the presence of discriminating and non-
discriminating conference calls 
 
CARi,j,t  =  β0 + β1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + β3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t + β4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t                  (5) 
                      + β5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t +β7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +β8 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t  




Estimation  Fama MacBeth Estimation from 12 quarterly regressions 
Variablea   
Coefficient 
Estimate          
(Newey West t-




MacBeth     










Estimates Z1d Z2d 
            
Intercept  0.010 ***  0.014 ** 8 2 0 3.36 2.25 
  (2.49)   (2.21)       
            
GNNDLarge_UE  1.613 ***  2.150 *** 10 6 0 7.39 3.73 
  (4.45)   (3.46)       
            
GNDCLarge_UE  2.765 ***  3.140 *** 11 10 0 13.59 6.74 
  (9.47)   (5.71)       
            
GNNDSmall_UE  8.960 ***  9.959 *** 12 11 0 11.60 8.46 
  (10.29)   (8.17)       
            
GNDCSmall_UE  9.388 ***  10.325 *** 12 11 0 15.5 7.23 
  (14.25)   (8.77)       
            
BNNDLarge_UE  1.632 ***  2.417 *** 12 8 0 8.90 5.85 
  (5.70)   (3.70)       
            
BNDCLarge_UE  2.063 ***  2.514 *** 12 11 0 11.95 7.22 
  (8.79)   (4.68)       
            
BNNDSmall_UE  9.719 ***  9.830 *** 12 9 0 8.66 7.58 
  (9.04)   (9.58)       
            
BNDCSmall_UE  7.595 ***  7.161 *** 12 7 0 8.07 5.60 
  (9.04)   (6.52)       
            
LNMVE  -0.001 **  -0.001  3 1 2 -2.66 -1.97 
  (-2.20)   (-1.43)       
            
BOOKMKT  0.003 **  0.001  8 2 2 0.06 0.04 
  (2.23)   (0.44)       
            
RETVOL  -0.234 ***  -0.376 ** 3 1 7 -6.26 -2.22 
  (-4.03)   (-2.23)       
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Adj R2, f  7.72%   10.50%       
Nc,f  12,702   1,062       
            
Discrimination 






statisticf P Value  
β1 = β2  6.55 0.01   0.990 1.41 0.19  
β3 = β4  0.20 0.65   0.366 0.29 0.77  
β5 = β6  1.42 0.23   0.097      0.20 0.85  
β7 = β8  2.77 0.10   -2.669    -2.44 0.03  
            
            
            
a See Appendix 2 for variable definitions.  ***,**, *  significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test 
b t-statistics are calculated using the Newey-West procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation.   
c  The pooled analyses are based on an initial sample of 13,188 observations.  The final sample used in estimation removes outliers 
based on procedures outlined in Besley, et al. (1980).  Earnings partitions represent the following number of observations (% of 
13,188 observations):  BNNDSmall_UE 1,227 (9%), BNNDLarge_UE 300 (2%), BNDCSmall_UE 1,983 (15%), BNDCLarge_UE 
438 (3%), GNNDSmall_UE 2,994 (23%), GNNDLarge_UE 357 (3%), GNDCSmall_UE 5,249 (40%), and GNDCLarge_UE 640 
(5%). 
d  Fama MacBeth t-statistic is calculated as the mean coefficient across 12 regressions divided by the standard error of the 








where tj is the t-
statistic for quarter j, kj is the degrees of freedom for quarter j, and N is the number of quarters.  Z2 = 1/)(/( −Ntstddevt .  Critical 
values for |Z1| and |Z2| are 1.782, 2.681 and 3.106 for significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  See Barth (1994) for 
discussion and use of Z1 and Z2 and application in Barth (1994) and Aboody and Lev (1998). 
c  Fama MacBeth t-statistics for differences across coefficients are calculated as the mean difference in coefficients across the 12 
regressions divided by the standard error of the coefficients. 






Ordinary least squares regressions assessing the earnings response to good and bad news in the presence of 
discriminating and non-discriminating conference calls using alternative definitions of abnormal 
announcement period returns 
 
 
DVi,j,t  =  β0 + β1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + β3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t + β4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t     (5)   
                      + β5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t +β7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +β8 BNDCSmall_UEi,j,t  
                      + β9 LNMVEi,j,t + β10 BOOKMKTi,j,t + β11 RETVOLi,j,t + υi,j,t 
  
  
DV = Equal Weighted 
CRSP adjusted CAR  
DV = size adjusted CAR 
Variablea   
Coefficient    
Estimate                
(Newey West t-
statistic)b   
Coefficient    
Estimate                   
(Newey West t-statistic)b 
       
Intercept  0.017 ***  0.012 *** 
  (4.06)   (2.83)  
       
GNNDLarge_UE  1.854 ***  1.759 *** 
  (5.09)   (4.94)  
       
GNDCLarge_UE  2.876 ***  2.751 *** 
  (9.97)   (9.48)  
       
GNNDSmall_UE  9.128 ***  9.177 *** 
  (10.51)   (10.54)  
       
GNDCSmall_UE  10.041 ***  9.622 *** 
  (15.25)   (14.56)  
       
BNNDLarge_UE  1.468 ***  1.530 *** 
  (5.18)   (5.48)  
       
BNDCLarge_UE  2.041 ***  2.031 *** 
  (8.57)   (8.59)  
       
BNNDSmall_UE  8.885 ***  9.446 *** 
  (8.48)   (8.96)  
       
BNDCSmall_UE 7.124 ***  7.661 *** 
  (8.32)   (9.00)  
       
LNMVE  -0.001 ***  -0.001 *** 
  (-3.53)   (-2.55)  
       
BOOKMKT  -0.000   0.003  
  (-0.09)   (1.65)  
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RETVOL  -0.340 ***  -0.239 *** 
  (-5.84)   (-4.09)  
       
Adj R2  7.81%   7.68%  
Nc   12,712    12,587  
       
Discrimination Tests: F Statistic P Value  F Statistic P Value 
β1 = β2 5.18 0.02  5.01 0.03 
β3 = β4 0.92 0.34  0.22 0.64 
β5 = β6 2.50 0.11  1.97 0.16 
β7 = β8 1.94 0.16  1.99 0.16 
       
 
Notes to Table 16 
***,**, *  significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test 
a See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. 
b t-statistics are calculated using the Newey-West procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation. 
c  The analyses are based on an initial sample of 13,188 observations.  The final sample used in estimation removes 





OLS regressions assessing the earnings response to good and bad news during discriminating and non-discriminating 
conference calls partitioned by investor sophistication 
 
CARi,j,t  =  HighSoph x (β0 + β1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + β3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t                                         
                                            + β4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t + β5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + β6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t   
                                            +β7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +β8 BNDCSmall_UEi,j,t   + β9 LNMVEi,j,t  
                                            + β10 BOOKMKTi,j,t + β11 RETVOLi,j,t) +                                                                              (6) 
                  LowSoph x (α0 + α1 GNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + α2 GNDCLarge_UEi,j,t + α3GNNDSmall_UEi,j,t                                         
                                            + α4 GNDCSmall_UEi,j,t + α5 BNNDLarge_UEi,j,t + α6 BNDCLarge_UEi,j,t   
                                            +α7 BNNDSmall_UEi,j,t +α8 BNDCSmall_UEi,j,t   + α9 LNMVEi,j,t  












(sophistication proxy = institutional 
holdings)d  (sophistication proxy = analyst following)d 
Variablea   
Coefficient 
Estimate          
(Newey West t-
statistic)b   
Coefficient   
Estimate           
(Newey West t-
statistic)b   
Coefficient  








Intercept  0.026 ***  -0.029 ***  0.016 **  0.000  
  (3.99)   (-2.72)   (1.82)   (0.04)  
             
GNNDLarge_UE  1.542 ***  1.064 *  1.392 ***  0.400  
  (2.83)   (1.71)   (2.55)   (0.49)  
             
GNDCLarge_UE  2.912 ***  3.300 ***  2.976 ***  3.241 *** 
  (6.73)   (5.57)   (6.73)   (4.25)  
             
GNNDSmall_UE  8.288 ***  9.513 ***  6.302 ***  8.965 *** 
  (5.99)   (5.86)   (4.30)   (5.59)  
             
GNDCSmall_UE  8.691 ***  11.754 ***  7.786 ***  10.713 *** 
  (7.78)   (9.77)   (7.26)   (8.30)  
             
BNNDLarge_UE  1.807 ***  -0.007   1.439 ***  0.675  
  (4.08)   (-0.01)   (3.21)   (0.76)  
             
BNDCLarge_UE  1.916 ***  1.732 ***  1.753 ***  2.595 *** 
  (5.47)   (3.85)   (5.61)   (3.79)  
             
BNNDSmall_UE  9.436 ***  9.194 ***  11.627 ***  11.623 *** 
  (5.47)   (4.74)   (6.34)   (5.45)  
             
BNDCSmall_UE  7.499 ***  7.257 ***  7.332 ***  8.511 *** 
  (6.13)   (4.52)   (5.54)   (4.86)  
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LNMVE  -0.002 ***  0.000   -0.002   -0.001 * 
  (-3.56)   (0.17)   (-1.53)   (-1.86)  
             
BOOKMKT  -0.001   0.000   0.004   -0.005 * 
  (-0.32)   (0.14)   (1.55)   (-1.65)  
             
RETVOL  -0.490 ***  0.137   -0.294 *  -0.102  
  (-5.16)   (1.21)   (-2.89)   (-0.90)  
             
Adj R2  8.42%      7.39%     
Nc  8,486      7,812     
             
Discrimination 
Tests:  F Statistic  P Value  
 
F Statistic   P Value  
             
β1 = β2  7.08   0.01   6.43   0.01  
β3 = β4  1.61   0.20   0.94   0.33  
β5 = β6  6.32   0.01   2.80   0.09  
β7 = β8  0.66   0.42   1.45   0.23  
             
α1 = α2  4.24   0.04   5.57   0.02  
α3 = α4  0.07   0.80   0.88   0.35  
α5 = α6  0.04   0.84   0.35   0.55  
α7 = α8  0.99   0.32   4.26   0.04  
             
            
            
 
 
Notes to Table 17: 
***,**, *  significant at .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively, in two-tailed test 
a See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. 
b t-statistics are calculated using the Newey-West procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation. 
c  The analyses are based on a sample of 8,486 (7,812) observations for the institutional holdings (analyst following) 
partitions.  This sample results from removing the middle 1/3 of observations on the institutional holdings (analyst 
following) variable, where such a measure was available, from the original initial sample of 13,188.  The final sample 
used in estimation removes outliers based on procedures outlined in Besley, et al. (1980). 
d  I proxy for investor sophistication in two ways, consistent with Schrand and Walther (2000).  The first method uses 
the extent of institutional holdings as of the most recent calendar quarter proceeding the fiscal quarter end.  High (low) 
sophistication, HighSoph (LowSoph) equals 1 if the firm-quarter observation falls in the top (bottom) third of the 
pooled distribution of institutional holdings.  The middle third observations are removed from the sample.   The 
second method uses the number of analysts contributing to the quarterly earnings forecast per I/B/E/S.  High (low) 
sophistication, HighSoph (LowSoph) equals 1 if the firm-quarter observation falls in the top (bottom) third of the 
pooled distribution of analyst following.  The middle third observations are removed from the sample.    
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Table 18:  Plots of Good News Earnings Announcement CARs 
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns FOLLOWING GOOD NEWS 





















10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90






















Notes to Table 18:  Mean cumulative abnormal return differences between discriminating and non-
discriminating firms are statistically different from zero at better than the 5% level (two-tailed) at each 
day increment displayed, except 50 days since the earnings announcement, which is  significant at better 
than the 10% level (two tailed). 
 
Sample Construction:  Sample contains the set of 8,386 good news earnings announcement firms (i.e. 
UE>0), of which 4,685 held discriminating conference calls and 3,701 held non-discriminating 
conference calls.   
Variable Definitions: 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) = daily raw return for each stock minus the CRSP value weighted 
index daily return, cumulated over the period (+2,+n), where n is the number of days since the earnings 
announcement and equals the following values in the set (10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90).  
 
Non-Discriminating:  Portfolio of stocks where Recdiff <=0. 





APPENDIX 1:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – Chapter 2 
Firm Level Variables 
Assets - Total ($MM) Total assets at fiscal quarter end (data14 from CRSP/Compustat quarterly 
merged database) 
Market Value of Equity 
($MM) 
Market value of equity at fiscal quarter end (data14*data61 from 
CRSP/Compustat quarterly merged database) 
Market to Book Ratio Market value of equity to book value of equity at fiscal quarter end 
(data14*data61/data60 from CRSP/Compustat quarterly merged database) 
Return on Assets Return on Assets at fiscal quarter end (data25/data44 from 
CRSP/Compustat quarterly merged database) 
CorpCount Total number of corporate participants on the call per the transcript 
NonCorpCount Total number of non-corporate participants on the call per the transcript 
NumAnalyst Number of sample analysts providing earnings forecasts and 
recommendations on I/B/E/S for the current fiscal quarter end 
IBESonCall Number of I/B/E/S analysts providing earnings estimates and 
recommendations for the current fiscal quarter that participate on the 
conference call 
IBESonCallDum Equals 1 if there is at least one IBES analyst covering the firm at quarter 
end who participates on the conference call, 0 otherwise 
Length of Conference Call 
(min) 
Length of conference call in minutes (where minutes is derived from total 
word count of transcript at 150 words per minute) 
Length of Q&A (min) Length of question and answer portion of the call, in minutes 
Open Openness of the conference call measured as the ratio of time spent on the 
question and answer portion of the call divided by the total time of the 
conference call 
MarketEst The consensus mean earnings per share calculated using all sample 
analysts who provided earnings estimates for the current fiscal quarter end 
OnCallEst Mean earnings estimate of the sample analysts who participated on the 
conference call 
Actual Actual reported earnings per share per I/B/E/S 
MarketFE The raw forecast error for all sample analysts covering the firm on I/B/E/S 
(Actual - MarketEst) 
OnCallFE The raw forecast error for those sample analysts participating on the 
conference call (Actual - OnCallEst) 
MarketRec The consensus mean stock recommendation using all sample analysts who 
provided earnings estimates for the current fiscal quarter end 
OnCallRec Mean stock recommendation of the sample analysts who participated on 
the conference call 
CEO option wealth 
sensitivity ($MM) 
Change in CEO wealth from option holdings, in Millions, to a 1 percent 
change in stock price, calculated as the derivative of total option holdings 
at most recent fiscal year end with respect to price (Core and Guay, 2002).  
Total option holdings are calculated as the sum of exercisable and 
unexercisable options outstanding per Execucomp at most recent fiscal 
year end.  Option inputs to calculate Black Scholes option values are as 
follows:  Time to maturity is assumed to be 7.5 years.  Volatility is 
measured over the period from the midpoint of the most recent fiscal year 
end through 5 years prior to that date.  Dividend yield is the average 
dividend yield over the most recent 3 years.  Strike and exercise prices 
equal the exercise price of current year option grants. 
InstHold Percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent calendar quarter 








OnCall Analyst participation on the conference call measured as 1 if the analyst asked a 
question during the conference call and 0 otherwise 
IBESRec Analyst stock recommendation as originally coded in I/B/E/S immediately prior 
to the conference call date.  I/B/E/S codes strong buy as 1, buy as 2, hold as 3, 
sell as 4 and strong sell as 5.  
Sbuy Strong buy recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent outstanding 
stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a strong buy, 0 otherwise 
Buy Buy recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent outstanding stock 
recommendation prior to the conference call is a buy, 0 otherwise 
Hold Hold recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent outstanding stock 
recommendation prior to the conference call is a hold, 0 otherwise 
Sell Sell recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent outstanding stock 
recommendation prior to the conference call is a sell, 0 otherwise 
Ssell Strong sell recommendation measured as 1 if I/B/E/S most recent outstanding 
stock recommendation prior to the conference call is a strong sell, 0 otherwise 
RelRec Relative stock recommendation, where values of 1 on this variable mean the 
analyst is the most favorable relative to other analysts following the firm, and 0 
indicates the analyst is the least favorable relative to other analysts following the 
firm.  RelRec calculated as the outstanding stock recommendation of analyst i 
following firm j in quarter t minus the smallest recommendation by any analyst 
following firm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range in the 
recommendation any analyst following firm j in quarter t.  Recommendations are 
obtained from I/B/E/S and are recoded so that strong buy =5, buy = 4, hold = 3, 
sell = 2 and strong sell = 1.   
RecChange The difference between the stock recommendation of analyst i following firm j in 
quarter t minus the stock recommendation of analyst i following firm j in quarter 
t-1, where stock recommendations are obtained from I/B/E/S and are recoded so 
that strong buy =5, buy = 4, hold = 3, sell = 2 and strong sell = 1.  Thus, positive 
values on RecChange indicate an analyst upgraded the stock and negative values 
indicate downgrades.   
AllStar All Star research analyst measured as 1 if the analyst made any of the 
Institutional Investor Research All-American teams as of the most recent prior 
year, 0 otherwise 
PriorAcc Prior earnings forecast accuracy, measured as the relative absolute forecast error 
of the analyst's prior quarter earnings forecast.  Relative absolute forecast error is 
calculated as the prior quarter absolute forecast error for analyst i following firm j 
in quarter t minus the smallest forecast error by any analyst following firm j in 
quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range in the prior quarter absolute 
forecast error for all analysts following firm j in quarter t. 
FirmExp_Raw Number of years the analyst has been following the firm, measured as the 
difference between the conference call date and the date of the analyst's first 
earnings estimate for the firm on I/B/E/S, scaled by 365 
FirmExp Firm experience measured as the relative time the analyst has covered the firm, 
where firm coverage is measured as the number of days between the conference 
call date and the analyst's first earnings forecast estimate date on I/B/E/S for the 
firm.  Relative firm experience is calculated as the firm experience for analyst i 
following firm j in quarter t minus the smallest firm experience by any analyst 
following firm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range in the firm 
experience for all analysts following firm j in quarter t. 
GenExp_Raw Number of years the analyst has been on I/B/E/S measured as the difference 
between the conference call date and the date of the analyst's first earnings 
estimate on I/B/E/S, scaled by 365 
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Appendix 1:  Variable Definitions (continued) 
GenExp General experience measured as the relative time the analyst has been on I/B/E/S 
where time on I/B/E/S is measured as the number of days between the conference 
call date and the analyst's first earnings forecast estimate date on I/B/E/S for any 
firm.  Relative general experience is calculated as the general experience for 
analyst i following firm j in quarter t minus the smallest general experience by 
any analyst following firm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range 
in the general experience for all analysts following firm j in quarter t. 
Inds_Raw Then number of two digit SIC code industries followed by the analyst during the 
most recently completed calendar year prior to the conference call date 
Inds Industry coverage measured as the relative number of industries covered by the 
analyst over the most recently completed calendar year prior to the conference 
call date.  Relative industry coverage is calculated as the industry coverage of 
analyst i following firm j in quarter t minus the smallest industry coverage by any 
analyst following firm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range in 
industry coverage for all analysts following firm j in quarter t. 
ForFreq_Raw Then number of quarterly earnings forecasts made for the firm during the most 
recently completed calendar year 
ForFreq Forecast frequency measured as the relative number of quarterly earnings 
forecasts issued by the analyst for the firm over the most recently completed 
calendar year prior to the conference call date.  Relative forecast frequency is 
calculated as the forecast frequency for analyst i following firm j in quarter t 
minus the lowest forecast frequency by any analyst following firm j in quarter t, 
with this difference scaled by the range in the forecast frequency for all analysts 
following firm j in quarter t. 
BrokerSize_Raw The number of analysts employed by the brokerage house employing the analyst 
as of the most recently completed calendar year prior to the conference call date 
BrokerSize Broker size measured as the relative number of analysts employed by the 
brokerage firm employing the analyst during the most recent calendar year prior 
to the conference call date.  Relative broker size is calculated as the broker size 
for analyst i following firm j in quarter t minus the smallest broker size of any 
analyst following firm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range in 
broker size for all analysts following firm j in quarter t. 
Companies_Raw Number of companies covered by the analyst during the most recently completed 
calendar year prior to the conference call date 
Companies Company coverage measured as the relative number of companies followed by 
the analyst over the most recently completed calendar year prior to the 
conference call date.  Relative company coverage is calculated as the company 
coverage of analyst i following firm j in quarter t minus the lowest company 
coverage by any analyst following firm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled 
by the range in company coverage for all analysts following firm j in quarter t. 
OnCallPrior Prior conference call participation measured as 1 if the analyst was identified as 
asking a question on any of the firm's prior conference calls in the sample, and 0 
otherwise. 
RecHorizon Forecast horizon measured as the number of days between the conference call 
date and the date of the analysts most recent stock recommendation 
Queue|OnCall The order of the analyst's first appearance on the conference call relative to all 
non-corporate conference call participants.  Relative order is calculated as (Total 
number of non-corporate conference call participants - position of analyst on 
conference call)/(Total number of non-corporate conference call participants - 1).  
The last non-corporate participant to ask a question has a value of 0, while the 
first non-corporate participant to ask a question has a value of 1. 
Time|OnCall The number of minutes managers spend answering questions of the analyst, 
measured as the number of words spoken to the analyst divided by 150, where 
150 is the word count per minute conversion 
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APPENDIX 2:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – Chapter 3 
Rec  Individual analyst outstanding stock recommendation immediately prior to 
the earnings conference call per I/B/E/S/.  Recommendation values have 
been coded to reverse the order in I/B/E/S such that more favorable 
recommendations have higher values (1 for Strong Sell, 2 for Sell, 3 for 
Hold, 4 for Buy and 5 for Strong Buy) 
SCRUTINIZING Likert scale response to the following question on a scale of 1 (Not 
Scrutinizing at all) to 9 (Very Scrutinizing):  Overall, on the following scale 
from 1 to 9, how scrutinizing do you feel the analyst's question(s) of 
management were? 
OPENENDED Likert scale response to the following question on a scale of 1 (Direct) to 9 
(Open ended): Overall, on the following scale from 1 to 9, would you 
characterize the analyst's question(s) of management to be direct or open 
ended? 
TOUGH Likert scale response to the following question on a scale of 1 (Softball) to 
9 (Tough): Overall, on the following scale from 1 to 9, did the analyst ask 
'softball' questions or 'tough' questions? 
CHALLENGING Likert scale response to the following question on a scale of 1 (Catered) to 
9 (Challenged):  Overall, on a scale from 1 to 9, did the analyst ask 
questions that catered to or challenged the manager? 
NEGNEWS Likert scale response to the following question on a scale of 1 (Positive 
news) to 9 (Negative news):  Overall, on a scale from 1 to 9, would you 
characterize the information ultimately provided by the manager as a result 
of the dialog with the analyst as positive or negative news about the firm?   
NETPOS_GI The difference between the number of positive words as identified by the 
General Inquirer software and the number of negative words identified by 
the General Inquirer software, scaled by the total number of words 
identified in the manager-analyst dialog. 
Miss Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm's actual earnings per share as 
reported in I/B/E/S was less than the mean earnings forecast calculated 
from all I/B/E/S analysts issuing earnings forecasts 60 days prior to the 
conference call, and zero otherwise.  When an analyst issues more than one 
forecast during this period, the most recent forecast is used for calculating 
the consensus. 
Discriminate Indicator variable that equals one if RecDiff >= 0, zero otherwise. 
RecDiff Difference between the average outstanding recommendations of all 
analysts that participated on the conference call by asking a question minus 
the average of outstanding recommendations for all analysts following the 
firm.  Positive values on this variable indicate that the analysts participating 
on the conference call had more optimistic views of the firm than the 
underlying population of analysts.  Individual analyst stock 
recommendations are coded as 5 for strong buy, 4 for buy, 3 for hold, 2 for 
sell, and 1 for strong sell. 
MarketRec The consensus mean stock recommendation using all sample analysts who 
provided earnings estimates for the current fiscal quarter end per I/B/E/S. 
NETPOS_GItran The difference between the number of positive words as identified by the 
General Inquirer software and the number of negative words identified by 
the General Inquirer software, scaled by the total number of words 
identified in the entire question and answer session of the conference call. 
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Appendix 2:  Variable Definitions (continued) 
UE Unexpected quarterly earnings per share scaled by the market value of 
equity per share 2 days prior to the earnings announcement.  Unexpected 
quarterly earnings per share is measured as the difference between actual 
reported quarterly earnings per share in I/B/E/S and the mean earnings 
forecast calculated from all I/B/E/S analysts issuing earnings forecasts 60 
days prior to the conference call.  When an analyst issues more than one 
forecast during this period, the most recent earnings forecast is used for 
calculating expected earnings. 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Returns, calculated as the firm's daily raw returns 
minus value weighted CRSP market returns, cumulated over the three days 
centered on the conference call date. 
RETVOL Equals the standard deviation of daily stock return volatilities calculated 
over the 100 trading days ending two days prior to the conference call date. 
LNMVE Natural logarithm of market value of equity at fiscal quarter end 
(data14*data61 from CRSP/Compustat quarterly merged database) 
Large_UE Indicator variable that equals UE if |UE| > .005, and zero otherwise.  
Freeman and Tse (1992) document that that the linear returns earnings 
relation is well specified when the earnings surprise is no greater than .5% 
of firm value.  
GN Good news earnings:  Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm met or beat 
earnings expectations (i.e. UE >= 0), zero otherwise. 
BN Bad news earnings:  Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm missed 
earnings expectations (i.e. UE < 0), zero otherwise. 
GNNDLarge_UE Equals UE when GN =1, Discriminate = 0, and Large_UE = 1, and zero 
otherwise 
GNDCLarge_UE Equals UE when GN =1, Discriminate = 1, and Large_UE = 1, and zero 
otherwise 
GNNDSmall_UE Equals UE when GN =1, Discriminate = 0, and Large_UE = 0, and zero 
otherwise 
GNDCSmall_UE Equals UE when GN =1, Discriminate = 1, and Large_UE = 0, and zero 
otherwise 
BNNDLarge_UE Equals UE when GN =0, Discriminate = 0, and Large_UE = 1, and zero 
otherwise 
BNDCLarge_UE Equals UE when GN =0, Discriminate = 1, and Large_UE = 1, and zero 
otherwise 
BNNDSmall_UE Equals UE when GN =0, Discriminate = 0, and Large_UE = 0, and zero 
otherwise 
BNDCSmall_UE Equals UE when GN =0, Discriminate = 1, and Large_UE = 0, and zero 
otherwise 
BOOKMKT Book value of common equity divided by market value of common equity 
as of fiscal quarter end. 
 103 
Appendix 3 – Discussion of Linguistic Software Package 
 
General Inquirer 
The General Inquirer (GI) is a content analysis software package developed and written 
by Philip Stone and collegues at Harvard University 
(http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/).  The GI identifies and counts word frequencies 
and word senses in submitted text files and matches them against words present in the 
“Harvard IV-4” dictionary.  This dictionary has numerous categories into which it can 
classify words.  The two categories used for this study are Positive and Negative, 
consistent with Kothari and Short (2003).  Positive is a category that includes 1,915 
words of positive outlook.  Negative is a category that includes 2,291 words of negative 
outlook.    For each text file submitted to GI, an output report is provided that counts the 
total number of words in the text file as well as the number of words that fall into each of 
the dictionary categories.  In the context of this study, conference call transcripts were 
used as text file inputs.  Interpreting GI output is ultimately an issue of comparing word 
counts and frequencies across dictionary categories.  Text analysis software has no ability 
to ascertain contextual meaning that results from the combination of consecutive words in 
a text document.  In this research, the difference between the number of positive and 
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